50 NAMES AND PROPOSITIONS. 



objects themselves, do not admit of the same kind of ginalysis. But 

 these relations, though not, like other relations, grounded upon states 

 of consciousness, are themselves states of consciousness : resemblance 

 is nothing but our feeling of resemblance ; succession is nothing but 

 our feeling of succession. Or, if this be disputed, (and we cannot, 

 without transgressing the bounds of our science, discuss it here,) at 

 least om- knowledge of these relations, and even our possibility of 

 knowledge, is confined to those which subsist between sensations or 

 other states of consciousness : for, though we ascribe resemblance, or 

 succession, or simultaneity, to objects and to attributes, it is always in 

 ^^rtue of resemblance or succession or simultaneity in the sensations 

 or states of consciousness which those objects excite, and on which 

 those attributes are grounded. 



§ 14. In the preceding investigation we have, for the sake of sim- 

 plicity, considered bodies only, and omitted minds. But what we 

 have said is applicable, mutatis mutandis, to the latter. The attributes 

 of minds, as well as those of bodies, are grounded upon states of feel- 

 ing or consciousness. But in the case of a mind, we have to consider 

 its own states, as well as those which it produces in other minds. 

 Every attribute of a mind consists either in being itself affected in a 

 certain way, or affecting other minds in a certain way. Considered 

 in itself, we can predicate nothing of it, but the series of its own feel- 

 ings. When we say of any mind, that it is devout, or superstitious, or 

 meditative, or cheerful, we mean that the ideas, emotions, or volitions 

 implied in those words, form a frequently recurring part of the series 

 of feelings, or states of consciousness, which fill up the sentient exist- 

 ence of that mind. 



In addition, however, to those attributes of a mind, which are 

 grounded upon its own states of feeling, attributes may also be ascribed 

 to it, in the same manner as to a body, grounded on the feelings which 

 it excites in other minds. A mind does not, indeed, like a body, excite 

 sensations, but it inay excite thoughts or emotions. The most important 

 example of attributes ascribed on this ground is, the employment of 

 terms expressive of approbation or blame. When, for example, we 

 say of any character, or (in other words) of any mind, that it is 

 admirable, we mean that the contemplation of it excites the sentiment 

 of admiration ; and indeed somewhat more, for the word implies that 

 we not only feel admiration, but approve that sentiment in ourselves. 

 In some cases, under the semblance of a single attribute, two are 

 really predicated : one of them, a state of the mind itself; the other, 

 a state with which other minds are affected by thinking of it : as when 

 we say of any one that he is generous. The word generosity ex- 

 presses a certain state of mind, but being a term of praise, it also 

 expresses that this state of mind excites in us another mental state, 

 called approbation. The assertion made, therefore, is two-fold, and 

 of the following purport : Certain feelings form habitually a part of 

 this person's sentient existence ; and, moreover, the idea of those feel- 

 ings of his excites the sentiment of approbation in ourselves or others. 



As we thus ascribe attributes to minds on the ground of ideas and 

 emotions, so may we to bodies on similar grounds, and not solely on 

 the ground of sensations : as in speaking of the beauty of a statue ; 

 since tliis attribute is gi-ounded upon the peculiar feeling of pleasure 



