THINGS DENOTED BY NAMES. 51 



which the statue prodiicos in our minds, and whicli is not a sensation, 

 but an emotion. 



VII. General Result. 



§ 15. Our survey of the varieties of Things whicli have been, or 

 which are capable of being, named — which have been, or are capable 

 of being, either predicated of other Things, or made themselves the 

 subject of predications — is now complete. 



Our enumeration commenced with Feelings. These we scrupulously 

 <listinguished from the objects which excite them, and from the organs 

 by which they are, or may be supposed to be, conveyed. Feelings are 

 of four sorts : Sensations, Thoughts, Emotions, and Volitions. What 

 are called perceptions are merely a particular case of Belief, and be- 

 lief is a kind of thought. Actions are merely volitions followed by an 

 ctlect. If there be any other kind of mental state not included under 

 these subdivisions, we did not think it necessary or proper in this place 

 to discuss its existence, or the rank which ought to be assigned to it. 



After Feelings we proceeded to Substances. These are either 

 Bodies or Minds. Without entering into the gi'ounds of the meta- 

 physical doubts which have been raised conceniing the existence of 

 Matter and Mind as objective realities, we stated as sufficient for us 

 the conclusion in which the best thinkers are now very generally 

 agreed, that all we can know of Matter is the sensations which it gives 

 us, and the order of occuri-ence of those sensations ; and that while the 

 substance Body is the unknown cause of our sensations, the substance 

 Mind is the unknown percipient. 



The only remaining class of Nameable Things is Attributes ; and 

 these are of three kinds, Quality, Relation, and Quantity. Qualities, 

 like substances, are knoAvn to us no otherwise than by the sensations 

 or other states of consciousness Avhich they excite ; and while, in 

 compliance with common usage, we have continued to speak of them 

 as a distinct class of Things, we showed that in predicating them no 

 one means to predicate anything but those sensations or states of 

 consciousness, on which they may bo said to be gi'ounded, and by 

 which alone they can be defined. Relations, except the simple cases 

 of likeness and unlikeness, succession and simultaneity, are similarly 

 grounded upon some fact, or phenomenon, that is, upon some series of 

 sensations or states of consciousness, more or less complicated. The 

 third species of attribute, Quantity, is also manifestly grounded upon 

 something in our sensations or states of feeling, since there is an indu- 

 bitable difference in the sensations excited by a larger and a smaller 

 bulk, or by a greater or a less degi-ee of intensity, in any object of 

 sense or of consciousness. All attributes, therefore, are to us nothing 

 but either our sensations and other staWs of feeling, or something inex- 

 tricably involved therein ; and to this even the peculiar and simple 

 relations just adverted to are not exceptions. Those peculiar rela- 

 tions, however, are so important, and, even if they might in strictness 

 be classed among our states of consciousness, are so fundamentally 

 distinct from any other of those states, that it would be a vain subtlety 

 to confound them under that common head, and it is necessary that 

 they should be classed apart. 



As the result, therefore, of our analysis, we obtain the following as 

 an enumeration and classification of all Nameable Things : — 



