PROPOSITIONS. 53 



should be some mode or form of indicating that such is the intention ; 

 some sign to distinguish a predication from any other kind of discourse. 

 This is sometimes done by a shght alteration of one of the words, called 

 an hijlection ; a,s when we say, Fire burns ; the change of the second 

 word fiom burn to burns showing that we mean to affirm the predicate 

 burn of the subject fire. But this function is more commonly fulfilled 

 by the word is, when an affii'mation is intended ; is not, when a nega- 

 tion; or by some other part of the verb to be. Tlie word which thus 

 serves the pui^jiose of a sign of predication is called, as wc formci-ly 

 observed, the copula. It is of the utmost importance that there should 

 be no indistinctness in our conception of the nature and office of the 

 copula; for confused notions respecting it are among the causes which 

 have spread mysticism over the field of logic, and perverted its specu- 

 lations into logomachies. 



It is apt to be supposed that the copula is much more than a mere 

 sign of predication; that it also signifies existence. In the proposition, 

 Socrates is just, it may seem to be implied not only that the quality 

 just can be affirmed of Socrates, but moreover that Socrates is, that is 

 to say, exists. This, however, only shows that there is an ambiguity in 

 the word is; a word which not only perfoiTns the function of the copula 

 in affirmations, but has also a meaning of its own, in virtue of which it 

 may itself be made the predicate of a proposition. That the employ- 

 ment of it as a copula does not necessarily include the affirmation of 

 existence, appears fi'om such a proposition as this, A centaur is a fiction 

 of the poets ; where it cannot possibly be implied that a centaur exists, 

 since the proposition itself expressly asserts that the thing has no real 

 existence. 



Many volumes might be filled with the frivolous speculations con- 

 cerning the nature of Being (ro bv, ovaia, Ens, Entitas, Essentia, and 

 the like), which have arisen fi-om overlooking this double meaning of 

 the words to be ; from supposing that when it signifies to exist, and 

 when it signifies to be some specified thing, as to be a man, to be Soc- 

 rates, to be seen or spoken of, to be a phantom, even to be a nonentity, 

 it must still, at bottom, answer to the same idea ; and that a meaning 

 must be found for it which shall suit all these cases. The fog which 

 rose from this naiTow spot diffused itself at an early period over the 

 whole surface of metaphysics. Yet it becomes us not to triumph over 

 the gigantic intellects of Plato and Aristotle because we are now able 

 to presence ourselves from many ciTors into which they, perhaps inev- 

 itably, fell. The fire-teazer of a modern steam-engine produces by his 

 exertions far greater effects than Milo of Crotono could, but he is not 

 therefore a stronger man. The Greeks seldom knew any language 

 but their own. This rendered it far more difficult for them than it is 

 for us, to acquire a readiness in detecting ambiguities. One of the 

 advantages of having systematically studied a plurality of languages, 

 especially of those languages which philosophers have used as the 

 vehicle of their thoughts, is the practical lesson we learn respecting 

 the ambiguities of words, by finding that the same word in one language 

 corresponds, on different occasions, to different words in another. 

 ^Vhen not thus exercised, even the strongest understandings find it 

 difficult to believe that things which have a common name, have not in 

 some respect or other a common nature ; and often expend much labor 

 not only unprofitably but mischievously (as was frequently done by 



