IMPORT OF PROPOSITIONS. G7 



butes ; that whatever has the attributes connoted by the suDJcct, has 

 also those connoted by the predicate ; that the latter set of attxibutes 

 constanlhj accompanij the foiiner set. Wliatever has the attributes of 

 man has the atti-ibute of mortality ; mortality constantly accompanies 

 the attributes of man. 



If it be remembered tliat every attiibute is grounded upon some fact 

 or phenomenon, either of outwai'd sense or of inward consciousness, 

 and that to possess an attinbute is another phrase for being the cause 

 of, or fonnuig part of, the fact or phenomenon upon which the attribute 

 is grounded ; we may add one more step to complete the analysis. 

 The proposition which asserts that one attribute always accompanies 

 another attribute, does really assert thereby no other thing than this, 

 that one phenomenon alway* accompanies another phenomenon ; inso- 

 much that where we find the one, we have assurance of the existence 

 of the other. Thus, in the proposition. All men are mortal, the word 

 man connotes the attributes which we ascribe to a certain kind of living 

 creatures, on the ground of certain phenomena which they exhibit, 

 and which are partly physical phenomena, namely the impressions 

 made on our senses by their bodily form and structure, and partly 

 mental phenomena, namely the sentient and intellectual life which they 

 have of their o^vn. All this is understood when we utter the word 

 man, by any one to whom the meaning of the word is known. Now, 

 when we say, Man is mortal, we mean that wherever these various 

 physical and mental phenomena are all found, there we have assurance 

 that the other physical and mental phenomenon, called death, will not fail 

 to take place. The proposition does not affirm when ; for the connota- 

 tion of the word mortal goes no further than to the occurrence of the phe- 

 nomenon at some time or other, leaving the precise time undecided. 



§ 5. We have already proceeded far enough not only to demonstrate 

 the error of Hobbes, but to ascertain the real import of by far the 

 most numerous class of propositions. The object of belief in a propo- 

 sition, when it asserts anything more than the meaning of words, is 

 generally, as in the cases which we have examined, either the coexist- 

 ence or the sequence of two phenomena. At the very commencement 

 of our inquiry, we found that every act of belief implied two Things ; 

 we have now ascertained what, in the most frequent case, these two 

 things are, namely two Phenomena, in other words, two states of 

 consciousness ; and what it is which the proposition affirms (or denies) 

 to subsist between them, namely either succession, or coexistence. 

 And this case includes innumerable instances which no one, previous 

 to reflection, would think of refeiTing to it. Take the following 

 example : A generous person is worthy of honor. "VTho would expect 

 to recognize here a case of coexistence between phenomena ? But so 

 it is. The attribute which causes a person to be termed generous, is 

 ascribed to him on the ground of states of his mind, and particulars of 

 his conduct : both are phenomena ; the former are facts of internal 

 consciousness, the latter, so far as distinct from the fonner, are physical 

 facts, or perceptions of the senses. Worthy of honor, admits of a 

 similar analysis. Honor, as here used, means a state of approving 

 and admiring emotion, followed upon occasion by corresponding out- 

 ward acts. " Worthy of honor" connotes all this, together with our 

 approval of the act of shoAving honor. All these are j^hcnomenaj 



