70 NAMES AND PROPOSITIONS. 



which are true of the class will be nearer to being true of those things 

 than any other equally general propositions. As, for instance, there 

 are substances called metals which have very few of the properties by 

 which metals are commonly recognized ; and almost every great family 

 of plants or animals has a few anomalous genera or species on its 

 borders, which are admitted into it by a sort of courtesy, and concern- 

 ino- which it has been matter of discussion to what family they properly 

 belonged. Now when the class-name is predicated of any object of 

 this description, we do, by so predicating it, affirm resemblance and 

 nothing more. And in order to be scrupulously correct, it ought to 

 be said, that in eveiy case in which we jjredicate a general name, we 

 affirm, not absolutely that the object possesses the properties designa- 

 ted by the name, but that it either possesses those properties, or if it 

 does not, at any rate resembles the things which do so, more than it 

 resembles any other things. In most cases, however, it is unnecessary 

 to suppose any such alternative, the latter of the two grounds being 

 very seldom that on which the assertion is made : and when it is, there 

 is generally some slight difference in the form of the expression, as, 

 This species (or genus) is considered, or may be ranl<ed, as belonging 

 to such and such a family : we should hardly say positively that it 

 does belong to it, vmless it possessed unequivocally the properties of 

 which the class-name is scientifically significant. 



There is still another exceptional case in which, although the predi- 

 cate is a name of a class, yet in predicating it we affirm nothing but 

 resemblance, the class being founded not upon resemblance in any 

 particular respect, but upon general unanalyzable resemblance. The 

 classes in question are those into which our simple sensations, or 

 other simple feelings, are divided. Sensations of white, for instance, 

 are classed together, not because we can take them to pieces, and say 

 they are alike in this, and not alike in that, but because we feel them 

 to be alike altogether, although in different degi'ees. When, there- 

 fore, I say. The color I saw yesterday was a white color, or, The 

 sensation I feel is one of tightness, in both cases the attribute I affirm 

 of the color or of the other sensation is mere resemblance, — simple 

 likeness to sensations which I have had before, and which have had 

 those names bestowed upon them. The names of feelings, like other 

 concrete general names, are connotative ; but they connote a mere 

 resemblance. When predicated of any individual feeling, the infor- 

 mation they convey is that of its likeness to the other feelings which 

 we have been accustomed to call by the same name. And thus much 

 may suffice in illustration of the kind of Propositions in whicli the 

 matter-of-fact asserted (or denied) is simple Resemblance. 



Existence, Coexistence, Sequence, Causation, Resemblance : one or 

 other of these is asserted (or denied) in every proposition, without ex- 

 ception. This five-fold di\-ision is an exhaustive classification of mat- 

 ters-of-fact ; of all things that can be believed or tendered for belief; 

 of all questions that can be propounded, and all answers that can be 

 retui-ned to them. Instead of Coexistence and Sequence, we shall 

 sometimes say, for greater particularity. Older in Place, and Order in 

 Time : Order in Place being one of the modes of coexistence, not ne- 

 cessary to be more particularly analyzed here ; while the mere fact of 

 coexistence, or simultaneousness, may be classed, together with Se- 

 quence, under the head of Order in Time. 



