IMPORT OF PROPOSITIONS. 71 



§ 7. In the foregoing incjuiry into the import of Propositions, we 

 have thought it necessai'y to analyze directly those ah)ne, in which the 

 tenus of the proposition (or the predicate at least) ai'e concrete terms. 

 But, in doing so, we have indirectly iuialyzed those in which the terms 

 are abstract. The distinction between an abstract term and its cor- 

 responding concrete, is no difference in what they are appointed to sig- 

 nify ; fur the real signification of a concrete general name is, as we 

 have so often said, its connation ; and what the concrete term con- 

 notes, forms the entire meaning of the abstract name. Since there is 

 nothing in the import of an absti'act name which is not in the impoi't 

 of the corresponding concrete, it is natural to suppose that neither can 

 there be anything in the import of a pi'oposition of which the terms are 

 abstract, but what there is in some proposition which can be framed of 

 concrete terms. 



And this presumption a closer examination will confirm. An ab- 

 stract name is the name of an attiibute, or combination of attributes. 

 The coiTesponding concrete is a name given to things, because of, and 

 in order to express, their possessing that attribute, or that combination 

 of attributes. \Vlien, therefore, we predicate of anything a concrete 

 name, the attribute is what we in reality predicate of it. But it 

 has now been shown that in all propositions of which the predicate is 

 a concrete name, what is really predicated is one of five things : Ex- 

 istence, Coexistence, Causation, Sequence, or Resemblance. An 

 attribute, therefore, is necessarily either an existence, a coexistence, 

 a causation, a sequence, or a resemblance. Wlien a proposition con- 

 sists of a subject and predicate which are abstract terms, it consists of 

 terms which must necessarilly signify one or other of these things. 

 When we predicate of any thing an abstract name, we affirm of the 

 thing that it is one or other of these five things ; that it is a case of 

 Existence, or of Coexistence, or of Causation, or of Sequence, or of 

 Resemblance. 



It is impossible to imagine any proposition expressed in abstract 

 terras, which cannot be transformed into a precisely equivalent propo- 

 sition in which the terms are concrete, namely, either the concrete 

 names Avhich connote tlie attributes themselves, or the names of the 

 fundamcnta of those attributes, the facts or phenomena on which they 

 are grounded. To illustrate the latter case, let us take this propo- 

 sition, of which only the subject is an abstract name, — " Thoughtless- 

 ness is dangerous." Thoughtlessness is an attribute grounded on the 

 facts which we call thoughtless actions ; and the proposition is equiva- 

 lent to this, Thoughtless actions are dangerous. In the next example 

 the predicate as well as the subject are abstract names : " Wliiteness 

 is a color;" or " The color of snow is a whiteness." These attributes 

 being grounded upon sensations, the equivalent propositions in the 

 concrete would be. The sensation of white is one of the sensations 

 called those of color, — The sensation of sight, caused by looking at 

 snow, is one of the sensations called sensations of white. In these 

 propositions, as we have before seen, the matter-of-fact asserted is a 

 Resemblance. In the following examples, the concrete terms are 

 those which directly coiTespond to the abstract names ; connoting the 

 attribute which these denote. "Prudence is a virtue:" this may be 

 rendered, " All prudent persons, in so far an prudent, are virtuous :" 

 " Courage is deserving of honor" thits, " All courageous persons are 



