72 NAMES AND PROPOSITIONS. 



deserving of honor so far forth as they are courageous;" which is 

 equivalent to this — " All courageous persons deserve an addition to the 

 honor, or a diminution of the disgi-ace, which would attach to them on 

 other grounds." 



In order to throw still further light upon the import of propositions 

 of which the terms are abstract, we will subject one of the examples 

 given above to a minuter analysis. The proposition we shall select is 

 the following — " Prudence is a virtue." Let us substitute for the 

 word virtue an equivalent but more definite expression, such as " a 

 mental qviality beneficial to society," or " a mental quality pleasing to 

 God," or whichever other of the definitions of virtue we prefer. What 

 the proposition asserts is a sequence, accompanied with causation, 

 namely, that benefit to society, or that the approval of God, is consequent 

 upon, and caused by, prudence. Here is a sequence ; but between 

 what % We understand the consequent of the sequence, but we have 

 yet to analyze the antecedent. Prudence is an attiibute ; and, in con- 

 nexion with it, two things besides itself are to be considered ; prudent 

 persons, who are the svbjecis of the attribute, and prudential conduct, 

 which may be called Xhe foundation of it. Now, is either of these the 

 antecedent % and, first, is it meant, that the approval of God, or benefit 

 to society, is attendant upon all prudent 2>crsons ? No ; except in so 

 far forth as they are prudent ; for prudent persons who are scoundrels 

 can seldom on the whole be beneficial to society, nor acceptable to 

 even finite wisdom. Is it upon prudential conduct, then, that divine 

 approbation and benefit to mankind are invariably consequent ] Nei- 

 ther is this the assertion meant when it is said that prudence is a 

 virtue ; except with the same reservation as before, and for the same 

 reason, namely, that j^rudential conduct, although in so far as it is pru- 

 dential it is beneficial to society, may yet, by reason of some other of 

 its qualities, be productive of an injury outweighing the benefit, and of 

 a divine displeasure exceeding the approbation which would be due 

 to the prudence. Neither the substance, therefore (viz., the person), 

 nor the phenomenon (the conduct), is an antec-edent upon which the 

 other tenn of the sequence is universally consequent. But the propo- 

 sition, " Prudence is a virtue," is an universal proposition. What is it, 

 then, upon which the proposition aflSrms the effects in question to be 

 universally consequent ] Upon that in the person, and in the conduct, 

 which causes them to be called prudent, and which is equally in them 

 when the action, though prudent, is wicked ; namely, a coiTect fore- 

 sight of consequences, a just estimation of their importance to the object 

 in view, and repression of any unreflecting impulse at vai'iance with 

 the deliberate purpose. These, which are states of the person's mind, 

 are the real antecedent in the sequence, the real cause in the causation, 

 which are asserted by the proposition. But these are also the real 

 ground, or foundation, of the attribute Prudence ; since wherever these 

 states of mind exist we may predicate prudence, even before we know 

 whether any conduct has followed. And in this manner every asser- 

 tion respecting an attribute may be transformed into an assertion exactly 

 equivalent respecting the fact or phenomenon which is the grotmd of 

 the attribute. And no case can be assigned, where that which is pre- 

 dicated of die fact or phenomenon, does not belong to one or other of 

 the five species formerly enumerated : it is either simple Existence, or 

 it is some Sequence, Coexistence, Causation, or Resemblance, 



