92 NAMES AND PEOPOSITIOXS. 



property to be destitute of meaning, its meaning cannot of course be 

 declared ; though we may indicate by language, as we might indicate 

 still more conveniently by pointing with the finger, upon what individ- 

 ual that particular mark has been, or is intended to be, put. It is no 

 definition of " John Thomson" to say he is " the son of General 

 Thomson ;" for the name John Thomson does not express this. Nei- 

 ther is it any definition of " John Thomson" to say he is " the man 

 now crossing the street." These propositions may serve to make 

 known who is the particular man to whom the name belongs ; but 

 that may be done still more unambiguously by pointing to him, which, 

 however, has not usually been esteemed one of the modes of definition. 



In the case of connotative names, the meaning, as has been so often 

 observed, is the connotation ; and the definition of a connotative name 

 is the proposition which declares its connotation. This may be done 

 either directly or indirectly. The direct mode would be by a propo- 

 sition in this &>xm : " Man" (or whatsoever the word may be) " is a 

 name connoting such and such attributes," or "is a name which, when 

 predicated of anything, signifies the possession of such and such attri- 

 butes by that thing." Or thus : JNIan is everything which possesses 

 such and such attributes : Man is everything which possesses corpo- 

 reity, organization, life, rationality, and a form resembling that of the 

 descendants of Adam. 



This form of definition is the most precise and least equivocal of 

 any ; but it is not brief enough, and is besides too technical and pe- 

 dantic for common discourse. The more usual mode of declaring the 

 connotation of a name, is to predicate of it another name or names of 

 known signification, which connote the same aggi'egation of attributes. 

 This may be done either by predicating of the name intended to be 

 defined, another connotative name exactly synonymous, as, " Man is a 

 human being," which is not commonly accounted a definition at all; 

 or by predicating two or more connotative names, which make up 

 among them the whole connotation of the name to be defined. In this 

 last case, again, we may either compose our definition of as many con- 

 notative names as there are attributes, each attribute being connoted 

 by one ; as, Man is a corporeal, organized, animated, rational being, 

 shaped so and so ; or we may employ names which connote several of 

 the attributes at once, as, Man is a rational animal, shaped so and so. 



The definition of a name, according to this view of it, is the simi 

 total of all the essential propositions which can be framed with that 

 name for their subject. All propositions the truth of which is implied 

 in the name, all those which we are made aware of by merely hearing 

 the name,' are included in the definition if complete, and may be 

 evolved from it without the aid of any other premisses ; whether the 

 definition expresses them in two or three words, or in a larger num- 

 ber. It is, therefore, not -without reason that Condillac and other ^\Ti- 

 ters have affirmed a definition to be an analysis. To resolve any 

 complex whole ijitQ_the elements of which it is comp^Sfded, is the" 

 meaning of analysis ; and this we do when we fepTacl§t>fie"word which 

 connotes a set of attributes collectively, by two or more which connote 

 the same attributes singly, or in smaller gl'oups. 



§ 3. From this, however, the question naturally arises, in what man- 

 ner are we to define a name which connotes only a single attribute 1 



