DEFINITION. 93 



for instance, "white," which connotes nothing but whiteness; "ra- 

 tional," which connotes nothing but the possession of reason. It might 

 seem that the meaning of such names could only be declared in two 

 ways ; by a synonymous tei'm, if any such can be found ; or in the 

 direct way already alluded to : " White is a name connoting the attri- 

 bute whiteness." Let us see, however, whether the analysis of the 

 meaning of the name, that is, the breaking down of that meaning into 

 separate parts, admits of being carried further. Without at present 

 deciding this question as to the word white, it is obvious that in the 

 case oi rational some further explanation may be given of its meaning 

 than is contained in the proposition, " Rational is that which possesses 

 the attiibute of reason ;" since the attribute reason itself admits of be- 

 ing defined. And here we must turn our attention to the definitions 

 of attributes, or rather of the names of attributes, that is, of abstract 

 names. 



In regard to such names of attributes as are connotative, and ex- 

 press attributes of those attributes, there is no difficulty : like other 

 connotative names, they are defined by declaring their connotation. 

 Thus, the word Jiiult may be defined, " a quality productive of evil or 

 inconvenience." Sometimes, again, the attribute to be defined is not 

 one attribute, but an union of several : we have only, therefore, to put 

 together the names of all the attributes taken separately, and we ob' 

 tain the definition of the names which belong to them all taken together ; 

 a definition which will correspond exactly to that of the coiTesponding 

 concrete name. For, as we define a concrete name by enumerating 

 the attributes which it connotes, and as the attributes connoted by a 

 concrete name form the entire signification of the corresponding ab- 

 stract one, the same enumeration will serve for the definition of both. 

 Thus, if the definition of a Imvian being be this, " A being, corporeal, 

 animated, rational, and shaped so and so," the definition of 7i«w?a??zVy 

 wall be, corporeity and animal life, combined with rationality, and with 

 such and such a shape. 



When, on the other hand, the abstract name does not express a 

 complication of attributes, but a single attribute, we must remember 

 that every attribute is grounded upon some fact or phenomenon, from 

 which and which alone it derives its meaning. To that fact or phe- 

 nomenon, called in a former chapter the foundation of the attribute, 

 we must, therefore, have recourse for its definition. Now, the foun- 

 dation of the attribute may be a phenomencoi of any degree of com- 

 plexity, consisting of many different parts, either coexistent or in 

 succession. To obtain a definition of the attribute, we must analyze 

 the phenomenon into these parts. Eloquence, for example, is the 

 name of one attribute only ; but this atti'ibute is grounded upon exter- 

 nal effects of a complicated nature, flowing fi-om acts of the person to 

 whom we ascribe the attribute ; and by resolving this phenomenon of 

 causation into its two parts, the cause and the effect, we obtain a defi- 

 nition of elo^iieiice, viz., thjL JjOwer of influencing the affections of h u- 

 man beinggljy means of speech or writing. 



A name, thefefbre, wli ether coiici'^Te'lof abstract, admits of defini- 

 tion, provided we are able to analyze, that is, to distinguish into parts, 

 the attribute or set of attributes which constitute the meaning both of 

 the concrete name and of the coiTesponding abstract : if a set of attri- 

 butes, by enumerating them ; if a single attribute, by dissecting the 



