94 NAMES AND PROPOSITIONS. 



fact or phenomenon ^vhether of perception or of internal consciousness, 

 which is the foundation of the attribute. But, further, even when the 

 fact is one of our simple feelings or states of consciousness, and there- 

 fore unsusceptible of analysis, the names both of the object and of the 

 atti'ibute still admit of definition ; or, rather, would do so if all our 

 Bimple feelings had names. Whiteness may be defined, the property 

 or power of exciting the sensation of white. A white object may be 

 defined an object which excites the sensation of white. The only 

 names which are unsusceptible of definition, because their meaning is 

 unsusceptible of analysis, are the names of the simple feelings them- 

 selves. These are in the same condition as proper names. They are 

 not, indeed, like proper names, unmeaning; for the words sensation 

 of white signify, that the sensation which I so denominate resembles 

 other sensations which I remember to have had before, and to have 

 called by that name. But as we have no words by whith to recall 

 tliose former sensations, except the very word which we seek to de- 

 fine, or some other which, being exactly synonymous with it, requires 

 definition as much, words cannot unfold the signification of this class 

 of names ; and we are obliged to make a direct appeal to tlie personal 

 experience of the individual whom we address. 



§ 4. Having stated what seems to be the true idea of a Definition, we 

 proceed to examine some opinions of philosophers, and some popular 

 conceptions on the subject, which conflict more or less with the above. 



The only adequate definition of a name is, as already remarked, one 

 which declares the fiicts, and the whole of the facts, which the name 

 involves in its signification. But with most persons the object of a 

 definition does not embrace so much; they look for nothing more, in 

 a definition, than a guide to the correct use of the term — a protection 

 against applying.it^ in a manner inconsistent with custom. aJad_^cpjiyen- 

 tion. AhytTimg, thereft)re,'Ts to them a sufiicientltelTnition of a term, 

 which will serve as a correct index to wl>at the term (denotes ; although 

 not embracing the whole, and sometimes, perhaps, not even any part, 

 of what it connotes. This gives rise to two sorts of unperfect, or un- 

 scientific definitions ; namely, Essential but incomplete Definitions, and 

 Accidental Definitions, or Descriptions. In the fofmer, a connotative 

 name is defined by a part only of its connotation ; in the Jatter, by 

 something which forms no part of the connotation at all. 



An example of the first kind of imperfect definitions is the follow- 

 ing : Man is a rational animal. It is impossible to consider this as a 

 complete definition of the word Man, since (as before remarked) if we 

 adhered to it we should be obliged to call the Houyhnhms men ; but 

 as there happen to be no Houyhnhms, this imperfect definition is suf- 

 ficient to mark out and distinguish from all other things, the objects at 

 present denoted by " man ;" all the beings actually known to exist, of 

 whom the name is predicable. Though the word is defined -by some 

 only among the attributes which it connotes,' not by all, it happens that 

 all known objects which possess the enumerated attributes, possess 

 also those which are omitted ; so that the field of predication which the 

 word covers, and the employment of it wliicliJs-^wiformableJ.o-as^^^ 

 are as well indicated by the inadequate definition as by an adeqiiafe" 

 one. Such definitions, however, are always liable to be overthrown 

 by the discovery of new objects in natm'e. 



