106 NAMES AND PROPOSITIONS. 



and finally, what are the common attributes, the possession of which 

 gives to them all, or to that portion of them, the character of resem- 

 blance which has led to their being classed together. Wlien these 

 common attributes have been ascertained and specified, the name 

 which belongs in common to the resembling objects, acquires a dis- 

 tinct instead of a vague connotation ; and by possessing this distinct 

 connotation, becomes susceptible of definition. 



In giving a distinct connotation to the general name, the philosopher 

 will endeavor to fix upon such atti-ibutes as, while they are common to 

 all the things usually denoted by the name, are also of greatest impor- 

 tance in themselves, either directly, or from the number, the conspic- 

 uousness, or the interesting character, of the consequences to which 

 they lead. He will select, as far as possible, such differentice as lead 

 to the greatest number of intei-esting 2>ropria. For these, rather than 

 the more obscure and recondite qualities on which they often depend, 

 give that general character and aspect to a set of objects, which deter- 

 mine the groups into which they naturally fall. But to mount up to 

 the more hidden agreement upon which these obvious and superficial 

 agreements depend, is often one of the most difficult of scientific prob- 

 lems. As it is among the most difficult, so it seldom fails to be among 

 the most important. And since upon the result of this inquiry respect- 

 ing the causes of the properties of a class of things, there incidentally 

 depends the question what shall be the meaning of a word ; some of 

 the most profound and most valuable investigations which philosophy 

 presents to us, have been introduced by, and have offered themselves 

 under the guise of, inquiries into the definition of a name. 



