FUNCTIONS AND VALUE O^ THE SYLLOGISM. 131 



a mark of mortality. But wlicn we conclude tliat the Duke of Wel- 

 lington is mortal, we Jo not infer this from the memorandum, but from 

 the former experience. All that we infer from the memorandum, is 

 our own previous belief, (or that of those who transmitted to us the 

 pixiposition,) concerning the inferences which that former experience 

 would waiTant. 



This view of the nature of the syllogism renders consistent and 

 intelligible what otherwise remains obscure and confused in the theory 

 of Archbishop Whately and other enlightened defendei's of the 

 syllogistic doctrine, respecting the limits to which its functions are 

 confined. They all affirm, in as explicit terms as can be used, that 

 the sole office of general reasoning is to prevent inconsistency in our 

 opinions; to prevent us from assenting to anything, the truth of which 

 would contradict something to which we had previously on good 

 grounds given our assent. And they tell us, that the sole gi'ound 

 which a syllogism aftbrds for assenting to the conclusion, is that the 

 supposition of its being false, combined with the supposition that the 

 premisses are true, would lead to a contradiction in terms. Now this 

 would be but a lame account of the real grounds which we have for 

 beheving the facts which we leani from reasoning, in contradistinction 

 to observation. The true reason why we believe that the Duke of 

 Wellington ^\'ill die, is that his fathers, and our fathers, and all other 

 persons wlio were contemporary with them, have died. Those facts 

 are the real premisses of the reasoning. But we are not led to infer 

 the conclusion from those premisses, by the necessity of avoiding any- 

 verbal inconsistency. There is no contradiction in supposing that all 

 those persons have died, and that the Duke of Wellington may, not- 

 withstanding, live for ever. But there would be a contradiction if we 

 first, on the gi'ound of those same premisses, made a general assertion 

 including and covering the case of the Duke of Wellington, and then 

 refused to stand to it in the individual case. There is an inconsistency 

 to be avoided between the memorandum we make of the inferences 

 Avhich may be justly drawn in future 'cases, and the inferences we 

 actually draw in those cases when they arise. With this vaew we 

 interpret our own formula, precisely as a judge intei-prets a law: in 

 order that we may avoid drawing any inferences not confoi'mable to 

 our former intention, as a judge avoids giving any decision' not con- 

 formable to the legislator's intention. The rules for this interpretation 

 are the rules of the syllogism : and its sole purpose is to maintain 

 consistency between the conclusions we draw in every particular case, 

 and the previous general directions for drawing them ; whether those 

 general directions were framed by ourselves as the result of induction, 

 or were received by us from an authority competent to give them. 



§ 5. In the above observations it has, I think, been clearly shown, 

 that, although there is always a process of reasoning or inference 

 where a syllogism is used, the syllogism is not a coiTect analysis of 

 that process of reasoning or inference ; which is, on the contrary, 

 (when not a mere inference fi-ora testimony,) an inference from partic- 

 ulars to particulars; authoi-ized by a previous inference from particu- 

 lars to generals, and substantially the same with it ; of the nature, 

 therefore, of Induction. But while these conclusions appear to me 

 undeniable, I must yet enter a protest, as strong as that of Archbishop 



