184 INDUCTION. 



of nature and the order of the universe : namely, that there are such 

 things in natui'e as parallel cases ; that what happens once, \n\l, under 

 a sufficient degree of similaTity of circumstances^ happen again, and 

 not only again, but always. This, I say, is an assumption, involved in 

 every case of induction. And, if we consult the actual course of 

 nature, we find that the assumption is waiTanted ; the fact is so. The 

 universe, we find, is so. constituted, that whatever is tine in any one 

 case, is true in all cases of a certain description ; the only difficulty is, 

 to find u'//at description. 



This universal fact, which is our waiTant for all inference from expe- 

 rience, has been described by diflerent philosophers in different forms 

 of language : that the course of nature is uniform ; that the universe is 

 governed by general laws ; and the like. One of the most usual of 

 these modes of expression, but also one of the. most inadequate, is that 

 which has been brought into familiar use by the metaphysicians of the 

 school of Reid and Stewart. The disposition of the human mind to 

 generalize from experience — a propensity considered by these philo- 

 sophers as an instinct of om- nature — they usually describe under the 

 name of " our intuitive conviction that the future ^^:ill resemble the 

 past." Now it has been well pointed out by Mr. Bailey,* that (whether 

 the tendency be qr not an original and ultimate element of our nature), 

 Time, in its modifications of past, present, and future, has no concern 

 either with the belief itself, or with the grounds of it. We believe 

 that fire will burn to-morrow, because it bunied to-day and yesterday; 

 but we believe, on precisely tlie same gi-ounds, that it burned before 

 we were born, and that it burns this very day in Cochin-China. It is 

 not fi-om the past to the future, as past and fiiture, that we infer, but 

 from the known to the unkno-wn ; from facts observed to facts unob- 

 served ; from what we have perceived, or been directly conscious of, 

 to what has not come within our experience. In this last predicament 

 is the whole region of the fliture ; but also the vastly greater portion 

 of the present and of the past. 



Whatever be the most proper mode of expressing it, the proposition 

 that the course of nature is uniform, is the fundamental principle, or 

 general axiom, of Induction. It would yet be a great error to offer 

 this large generalization as any explanation of the inductive proce&s. 

 On the contrary, I hold it to be itself an instance of induction, and 

 induction by no means of the most obvious kind. Far from being the- 

 first induction we make, it is one of the last, or at all events one of 

 those which are latest in attaining strict philosophical accuracy. As 

 a general maxim, indeed,,it has scarcely entered into the minds of any 

 but philosophers ; nor even by them, as we shall have many opportu- 

 nities of remarking, have its extent and limits been always very justly 

 conceived. Yet this principle, though so far from being our. earliest 

 induction, must be considered as our wan'ant for all the ojhers, in this 

 sense, that unless it were true, all other inductions would be fallacious. 

 And this, as we have ah'eady seen, is the sole mode in which the gene- 

 ral propositions which we place at the head of our reasonings when 

 we throw them into syllogisms, ever really contribute to their validity. 

 Archbishop Wliately has well remarked, that every induction is a 

 syUogism with the major premiss suppressed ; or (as I prefer express- 



* Essays on the Pursttit of TnitL 



