GROUND OF INDUCTION. 185 



ing it), that every imluctioii may be thrown into the form of a syllo- 

 gism, by supplying a major premiiss. If this be actually clone, the 

 principle which Ave are now considering, that of the uniformity of the 

 cour^^e of nature, will appear as the ultimate major premiss of all in- 

 ductions ; ami will, therefore, stand to all inductions in the rplation in 

 which, as has been shown at so much length, the major proposition of 

 a syllogism always stands to the conclusion; not contributing at all to 

 prove it, but being a necessary condition of it» being proved ; since no 

 conclusion is. proved for which there cannot be found a true major 

 j^remiss.* 



It was not to be expected that in the case of this axiom, any more 

 than of other axioms, there should be unanimity among philosophers 

 with respect to the gi'ounds upon which it is to be received as true. 

 I have already stated that I regard it as itself a generalization from, 

 experience. Others hold it to be a principle which, antecedently to 

 any verification by experience, we are compelled by the constitution 

 of our thinking faculty to assume as true. Having so recently, and at 

 so much length, combated a similar doctrine as applied to the axioms 

 of mathematics, by arguments which are in a great measure applicable 

 to the present case, I shall defer the more particular discussion of this 



* From the fact, that every induction maybe expressed in the form of a syllogism. 

 Archbishop Whately concludes that Induction itself is but a peculiar case of ratiocination, 

 and that the universal type of all Inference, or Reasoning, is the Syllogism. Our own 

 inquiries have led us to a directly opposite result. Instead of resolving Induction into 

 Ratiocination, it has appeared to us that Ratiocination is itself resolvable into Induction. 

 The Archbishop's theory may, I think, be shown to be fallacious by following out his ovvn 

 train of thought. The induction, " Johi>« Peter, Thomas, &c., are mortal, therefore all 

 mankind are mortal," may, as he justly says, be thrown into a syllogism by preti.xing as a 

 major premiss (what is at any rate a necessary condition of the validity of the argument) 

 namely, that whatever is true of John, Peter, Thomas, &c,, is true of all mankind. So 

 far the case is made out ; and Archbishop Whately (who, endowed with a penetrating and 

 active rather than a patient and persevering intellect, seldom fails to cast his sounding line 

 to a greater depth than his predecessors, and when he has done this, scarcely seem? to 

 care whether he reaches the bottoui or not) omitted to ask himself the further question, 

 How we come by the major premiss '. It is not self-evident ; nay, in all cases of unwarranted 

 generalization, it is not true. How, then, is it arrived at? Necessarily either by induction 

 or ratiocination ; and If by induction, then, on the Archbishop's princi[)le&, it is by ratiocina- 

 tion still, that is, by a previous syllogism. This previous syllogism it is, therefore, necessary 

 to construct. There is, in the long run, only one possible construction : the real proof that 

 whatever is true of John, Peter, &c., is true of all mankind, can onf>' be, that a different 

 supposition would be inconsistent with the uniformity which we' kndvv to exist in, the 

 course of nature." Whether there would be this iuconsistcncy or nqt, may be a matter of 

 long and delicate inquiry ; but unless there would, we have no sufficient ground for the 

 major of the inductive syllogism. It hence appears, that if we throw the whole course of 

 any inductive argument into a series of syllogisms, we shall arrive by more or fewer steps 

 at an ultimate syllogism, which will have for its major premiss the principle, or axiom, of 

 the uniformity of the course of nature. Having reached this point, wc have the whole 

 field of induction laid out in syllogisms, and every instance of inference from experience 

 exhibited as the conclusion of ratiocination, except one ; but that one, unhappily, includes 

 all the rest. Whence came the universal major? What proves to' us that nature is 

 governed by general laws ? Where are the premisses of the syllogism of which that is the 

 conclusion? Here, at least, is a case of induction which cannot be resolved into syllogism. 



And undoubtedly it would be the ideal perfection of Inductive Philosophy if all other 

 general truths could be exhibited as conclusions tjeduced from that widest generalization 

 of all. But such a mode of presenting them, however useful in giving coherence and 

 systematic unity to our thoughts, would be an inversion of the real order of proof. This great 

 generalization must itself have been founded on prior generahzations : the obscurer laws 

 of nature were discovered by means of it, but the more obvious ones must have been 

 understood and assented to as general truths before it was ever heard of We should 

 never have dared to affirm that all phenomena take place according to general laws, if we had 

 not first arrived, in the case of a great multitude of phenomena, at some knowledge of the 

 laws themselves ; which could be done no otherwise than by induction. .\rciii>ishop 

 Whately's theory, therefore, implying, as it does, the consequence that we never could 

 have had a single well-grounded induction unless we had already reached that highest 

 generalization, must, I conceive, be regarded as untenable. 

 Aa 



