CHANCE, AND ITS ELIMINATION. 315 



that the stars are its cause, nor that they arp in anywise connected 

 with it. As strong a case of coincidence, therefore, as can possibly 

 exist, and a much stronger one in point of mere frequency than most 

 of those which prove laws, does not here prove a law: whyl because, 

 since the stars exist always, they must coexist with every other phe- 

 nomenon, whether connected with them by causation or not. The 

 uniformity, gieat though it be, is no greater than would occur on the 

 supposition that no such connexion exists. 



On the other hand, suppose that we were inquiring whether there 

 be any connexion between raiu and any particular wind. Rain, we 

 know, occasionally occurs with every wind ; therefore the connexion, 

 if it exists, cannot be an actual law ; but still, rain may be connected 

 wth some particular wind through causation ; that is, although they 

 cannot be always effects of the same cause (for if &o they would always 

 coexist), there may be so77ie causes common to the two, so that in so 

 far as either is produced by those common causes, they \vill, from the 

 laws of the causes, be found to coexist. How, then, shall we ascertain 

 this ] The obx'ious answer is, by obsci"ving whether rain occurs with 

 one wind more frequently than with any other. That, however, is not 

 enough ; for perhaps that one wind blows more fi-equently than any 

 other ; so that its blowing more fiequently in rainy weather is no more 

 than would happen, although it had no connexion wth the causes of 

 rain, provided it were not connected with causes adverse to rain. In 

 England, westerly winds blow during about twice as great a portion 

 of the year as easterly. If, therefore, it rains only twice as often with 

 a westerly, as with an easterly wind, we have no reason to infer that 

 any law of nature is concerned in the coincidence. If it rains more 

 than twice as often, we may be sure that some law is concenied ; 

 either there is some cause in nature tending to produce both rain and 

 a westerly wind, or a westerly wind has itself some tendency to pro- 

 duce rain. But if it rains less than twice as often, we may draw a 

 directly opposite inference ; the one, instead of being a cause, or con- 

 nected with causes of the other, must be connected with causes ad- 

 verse to it, or with the absence of some cause which produces it ; and 

 although it may still rain much oftener with a westerly wind than with 

 an easterly, so far would this be from proving any connexion between 

 the phenomena, that the connexion proved would be between rain and 

 an easterly wind, the wind to which, in mere frequency of coincidence, 

 it is least allied. 



Here, then, are two examples : in one, the greatest possible fre- 

 quency of coincidence, with no instance whatever to the contrary, does 

 not prove that there is any law ; in the other, a much less frequency 

 of coincidence, even when non-coincidence is still more frequent, does 

 prove that there is a law. In both cases the principle is the same. In 

 bfith we consider the positive frequency of the phenomena themselves, 

 and how groat frequency of coincidence that must of itself bring about, 

 without supposing any connexion between them, provided there be no 

 repugnance ; provided neither bo connected with any cause tending 

 to frustrate the other. If we find a greater frequency of coincidence 

 than this, we conclude that there is some connexion ; if a less fre- 

 quency, that there is some repugnance. In the former case, we con- 

 clude that one of the phenomena can under some circumstances cause 

 the other, "or that there exists something capableof causing them both; 



