REMAINING LAWS OP NATURE. 3G1 



circumstances of time and place, and endowed with the needful perfec- 

 tion of organs. My belief that the Emperor of China exists, is simply 

 iny belief that if I were transported to the imperial palace, or somfe 

 other locality in Pckin, I should see him. My belief that Julius Cee- 

 sar existed, is my belief that I should have seen him if I had bec?i pres- 

 ent in the Held of Pharsalia, or in the senate-house at Rome. When 

 I believe that stars exist beyond the utmost range of my vision, though 

 assisted by the most povvei-ful telescopes yet invented, my belief, philo- 

 sophically expressed, is, that with still better telescopes, if such existed, 

 I could see them, or that they may be perceived by beings less remote 

 from them in space, or whose capacities of perception are superior to 

 mine. 



The existence, therefore, of a phenomenon, is but another word for 

 its being perceived, or for the infeiTed possibility of percei\'ing it. 

 "Wlien the phenomenon is within the range of present observation, by 

 present observation we assure ourselves of its existence ; when it is 

 beyond that range, and is, therefore, said to be absent, we infer its 

 existence from marks or evidences. But what can these evidences be ? 

 Other phenomena; ascertained by induction to be connected with the 

 given phenomenon, either in the way of succession or of coexistence. 

 The simple existence, therefore, of an individual phenomenon, when 

 not directly perceived, is inferred from some inductive law of succes- 

 sion or coexistence : and is consequently not amenable to any peculiar 

 inductive principles. We prove the existence of a thing, by proving that 

 it is connected by succession or coexistence with some known thing. 



With respect to general propositions of this class, that is, which affirm 

 the bare fact of existence, they have a peculiai'ity which renders the 

 logical treatment of them a very easy matter ; they are generalizations 

 which are sufficiently proved by a single instance. That ghosts, or 

 unicoi'ns, or sea-serpents exist, would be fully established if it could 

 be ascertained positively that such things haid been even once seen. 

 Whatever has once happened, is capable of happening again; the only 

 question relates to the conditions under which it happens. 



So far, therefore, as relates to simple existence, the Inductive Logic 

 has no knots to untie. And we may proceed to the remaining two of 

 the great classes into which facts have been divided ; Resemblance, and 

 Order in Sjjace. 



§ 2. Resemblance and its opposite, except in the case in which they 

 assume the names of Equality and Inequality, are seldom regarded as 

 objects of science ; they are supposed to be perceived by simple appre- 

 hension ; by merely applying our senses or directing our attonticjn to 

 the two objects at once, or in immediate succession. And this simul- 

 taneous or virtually simultaneous application of our faculties to the two 

 things which are to be compai'ed, docs necessarily constitute the ulti- 

 mate appeal, wherever such application is practicable. But in most 

 cases, it is not practicable : the objects cannot be brought so closely 

 together that the feeling of their resemblance (at least a complete feel- 

 ing of it) directly arises in the mind. We can only compare each of them 

 with some third object capable of being transported from one to the otlier. 

 And besides, even when the objects can be brought into immediate 

 juxtaposition, their resemblance or difference is but imperfectly kno^vn 

 to us unless we have compared them minutely, part by part. Until 

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