GROUNDS OF DISBELIEF. 377 



the opinions which (not to mention otlicr testimonies) the New Testa- 

 ment itself shows to have heen generally prevalent in the apostolic 

 age ; when it was believed intleeil tliat miracles were necessary as cre- 

 dentials, and tliat whoever was sent by God must have the power of 

 working them ; but no one dreamed that such power sufficed by itself 

 as proof of a divine mission, and St. Paul expressly warned the churches, 

 if any one came to ihem working miracles, to observe what he taught, 

 and unless he preached " Christ, and him crucified," not to listen to 

 the teaching. There is no reason, therefore, that timid Christians 

 should shrink from accepting the logical canon of the Grounds of Dis- 

 belief And it is not hazarding much to predict that a schoitl which 

 peremptorily rejects all evidences of religion, except such as, when re-* 

 lied upon exclusively, the canon in question irreversibly condemns ; 

 which denies to mankind the right to judge of religious doctrine, and 

 bids them depend on miracles as their sole guide ; must, in the present 

 state of the human mind, inevitably fail in its attempt to put itself at 

 the head of the religious feelings and convictions of this country : by 

 whatever learning, argumentative skill, and even, in many respects, 

 comprehensive views of human affairs, its peculiar doctrines may be 

 recommended to the acceptance of thinkers. 



§ 3. It appears from what has been said, that the assertion that a cause 

 has been defeated of an eflect which is connected with it by a completely 

 ascertained law of causation, is to be disbelieved or not, according to the 

 probability or improbability that there existed in the particular instance 

 an adeipiate counteracting cause. To form an estimate of this, is not 

 more difficult than of any other probability. With regard to all known 

 causes capable of counteracting the given causes, we have generally 

 some previous knowledge of the frequency or rarity of their occur- 

 rence, from whi(;h we may draw an inference as to the antecedent 

 improbability of their having been present in any particular case. 

 And neither in respect to known nor unknown causes are we re<juired 

 to pronounce upon the probability of their existing in nature, but only 

 of their having existed at the precise time and place at which the 

 transaction is alleged to have happened. We are seldom, therefore^, 

 without the means (when the circumstances of the case are at all 

 known to us) of judging how far it is likely that such a cause should 

 have existed at tliat time and place without manifesting its presence by 

 some other marks, and (in the case of an unknown cause) without 

 having hitherto manifested its existence in any other instance. Ac-« 

 cording as this circumstance or the falsity of the testimony appears 

 more improbable, that is, conflicts with an approximate generalization 

 of a higher ordc'r, we behove the testimony, or disbelieve it; with a 

 stronger or a wt^aker degree of conviction, according to the prepon- 

 derance : at least until we have sifted the matter further. 



So much, th(Mi, for the case in which the alleged fact conflicts, or 

 appears to conflict, with a real law of causation. But a more common 

 case, perhaps, is that of its conflicting with uniformities of mere co- 

 existence, not proved to be dependent on causation : in other words, 

 with the properties of Kinds. It is with these uniformities princi- 

 pally, that the marvelous stories related by travolhjrs are apt to be at 

 variance : as of men with tails, or with wings, and (until confirmed by 

 experience) of flying fish ; or of ice, in the celebrated anecdote of the 

 3B 



