REaUISITES OP LANGUA&E. • 401 



name wherever one is needed; wherever there is anything to he desig- 

 nated by it, which it is of iniportartce to express. . 



The I'ornier of these requisites is that to which our attention will be 

 exclusively directed in the present diapter. 



§ 2. Every general name, tlicn, must have a certain and knowablo 

 meaning. Now the meaning (as has -so often been" explained) of a 

 general connotative name, resides in the connotation ; in the attribute 

 on accouiit of which, and to express which, the name is given. Thus, 

 tlie name animal being given to all things which possess the attributes 

 of sensation and voluntary moti(in, the word connotes tliose attributes 

 exclusively, and they constitute the whole of its meaning. If the 

 name be abstract, its denotation is the same with the connotation 

 of the corresponding concrete: it designates di^rectly the attribute, 

 which tire concrete term implies. • To give a precise meaning to 

 general names is, then, to fix with steadii>ess the attribute or attributes 

 connoted by each concrete general name, and denoted by the coire- 

 sponding abstract. Since -abstract names, in the order of their creation, 

 do not precede but follow concrete ones, as is proved by the, etymolo- 

 gical fact that they are almost always derived from them ; we may 

 consider their meaning as. determined by, and dependent npon, the 

 meaning of their concrete : and thus the problem of giving a distinct 

 meaning to general language, is all included in that of giving a precise 

 connotation to all concrete general names. 



This is not difficult in the case of new names ;'' of the technical terms 

 created by philosophic inquirers for the purposes of science or art. 

 But when a name is in common use, the difficulty is greater ; the pro- 

 blem in this case not being that df choosing a convenient connotation 

 for the name, but of ascertaining and fixing the connotation with which 

 it is already used. That thie can ever be a matter of doubt, is a sort 

 of paradox. But the vulgar (including in that term all who have not 

 accurate habits of thought) seldom know exactly what assertion they 

 intend to make, what common property th^y mean to express, when 

 they apply the same name to a immber of different things. All which 

 the name expresses with them, when they predicate it of an object, is 

 a confused feeling of resemblance between that object and some of the 

 other things which they have been accustomed to denote by the name. 

 They have applied the name Stone to various objects previously seen ; 

 they see a new object, which appears to ihem something like the 

 former, and they call it a stone, without asking thcrnselves in what 

 respect it is like, or what mode or degree of teserhblance the best 

 authorities, or even they themselves, requixc as a waiTant for using 

 the name. This rough, general impression of resemblance is, how- 

 ever, made up' of particular circumstaiices of resemblance ; and into 

 these it is the business of the logician to analyze it ; to ascertain what 

 points of resemblance among the different things commonly called by 

 the name, have pivjduced upon the common mind this vague feeling of 

 likeness ; have given to the things the similarity of aspect, which has 

 made them a class, and has caused the same name to be bestowed 

 upon them. ' • , 



But although general hames, aie imposed by the vulgar without any 

 more definite connotation than that <»f a vague resemblance ; general 

 propositions come in time to be, made, in wliich predicates are applied 

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