428 OPERATIONS SUDSIDIARY TO INDUCTION. 



while the definition can only declare the first : and hence the appear- 

 ance that the signification of such terms cannot be conveyed by a 

 defijiition : which appearance, however, is fallacious. The name Viola 

 odorata denotes a Kind, of which a certain number of characters, 

 sufficient to distinguish it, are enunciated in botanical works. This 

 enumeration of characters is stu'ely, as in other cases, a definition of the 

 name. No, say some, it is not a definition, for the name Viola odorata 

 does not mean those characters ; it means that particular gi-oup of 

 plants, and the characters are selected from among a much gTcater 

 number, merely as marks by which to recognize the group. By no 

 means, I reply ; the name does not mean that group, for it Avould be 

 applied to that group no longer than while the gi'oup is believed to be 

 an infima species; if it were to be discovered that several distinct 

 Kinds have been confounded under this one name, no one would any 

 longer apply the name Viola odorata to the whole of the group, but 

 would apply it, if retained at all, to one only of the Kinds contained 

 therein. What is imperative, therefore, is not that the name shall de- 

 note one particular collection of objects, but that it shall denote a Kind, 

 and a lowest Kind. The form of the name declares that, happen what 

 will, it is to denote an infima species ; and that, therefore, the proper- 

 ties which it connotes, and which are expressed in the definition, are 

 to be connoted by it no longer than while we continue to believe that 

 those properties, when found together, indicate a Kind, and that the 

 whole of them are found in no more than one Kind. 



With the addition of this peculiar connotation, imj^lied in the form 

 of every word which belongs to a systematic nomenclature; the set of 

 characters which is employed to discriminate each Kind from all other 

 Kinds (and which is a real definition) constitutes as completely as in 

 any other case the whole meaning of the term. It is no objection to 

 say that (as is often the case in natural history), the set of characters 

 may be changed, and another substituted as being better suited for the 

 pui'poSe of distinction, while' the word, still continuing to denote the 

 same group of things, is not considered to have changed its meaning. 

 For this is no more than may happen in the case of any other general 

 name : we may, in reforming its connotation, leave its denotation un- 

 touched ; and it is generally desirable to do so. The connotation, 

 however, is not the less for this the real meaning, for we at once apply 

 the name wherever the characters set down in the definition are found; 

 and that which exclusively guides us in applying the term, must con- 

 stitute its signification. If we find, contrary to our previous belief, 

 that the characters are not peculiar to one species, we cease to use the 

 term coextensively with the characters ; but then it is because the 

 other portion of the connotation fails ; the condition that the class must 

 be a Kind. The connotation, therefore, is still the meaning ; the set 

 of descriptive characters is a true definition : and the meaning is un- 

 folded, not indeed (as in other cases) by the definition alone, but by 

 the definition and the form of the word taken together. 



§ 6. We have now analyzed what is implied in the two principal 

 requisites of a philosophical language ; first, precision or definiteness, 

 and secondly, completeness. Any further remarks on the mode of 

 constructing a nomenclature must be deferred until we treat of Classi- 

 fication ; the mode of naming the Kinds of things being necessarily 



