452 FALLACIES. 



aberration, be supposed to prove another fact, must stand in some 

 special position with regard to it; and if we could ascertain and define 

 that special position, we should perceive the origin of the error. 



We cannot regard one fact as evidential^ of another unless we 

 believe that the two are always, or in the majority of cases, conjoined. 

 If we believe A to be evidentiary of B, if when we see A we are 

 inclined to infer B fi'om it, the reason is because we believe that where- 

 ever A is, B also either always or for the most part exists, either as an 

 antecedent, a consequent, or a concomitant. If when we see A we are 

 inclined not to expect B, if we believe A to be evidentiary of the absence 

 of B, it is because we believe that where A is, B either is never, or at 

 least seldom, found. Erroneous conclusions, in short, no less than 

 coiTect conclusions, have an invariable relation to a general formula, 

 either expressed or tacitly implied. When we infer some fact from 

 some other fact which does not really prove it, we either have admitted, 

 or if we maintained consistency, ought to admit, some groundless gen- 

 eral proposition respecting the conjunction of the two phenomena. 



For every property, therefore, in facts, or in our mode of considering 

 facts, which leads us to believe-that they are habitually conjoined when 

 they are not, or that they are not when in reality they are, there is a 

 corresponding kind of Fallacy; and an enumeration of Fallacies would 

 consist in a specification of those properties in facts, and those pecu- 

 liarities in our mode of considering them, which give rise to this eri'o- 

 neous opinion. 



§ 2. To begin, then ; the supposed connexion, or repugnance, between 

 the two facts, may either be a conclusion from evidence (that is, from 

 some other proposition or propositions) or may be admitted without 

 any such ground; admitted, as the phrase is, on its own evidence : em- 

 bra,ced as self-evident, as an axiomatic truth. This gives rise to the first 

 great distinction, that between Fallacies of Inference, and Fallacies of 

 Simple Inspection. In the latter division must be included not only 

 all cases in which a proposition is believed and held for true, literally 

 without any extrinsic evidence, either of specific experience or general 

 reasoning ; but those more frequent cases in which simple inspection 

 creates ?i presumption in favor of a proposition; not sufficient for belief, 

 but sufficient to cause the strict principles of a regular induction to be 

 dispensed with, and creating a predisposition to believe it on evidence 

 which would be seen to be insuflScient if no such presumption existed. 

 This class, comprehending the whole of what may be termed , Natural 

 Prejudices, and which I shall call indiscriminately Fallacies of Simple 

 Inspection or Fallacies a priori., shall be placed at the head of our list. 



Fallacies of Inference, or eiToneous conclusions from supposed 

 evidence, must be subdivided according to the nature of the apparent 

 evidence from which the conclusions are drawn ; or (what is the same 

 thing,) according to the particular kind of sound argument which the 

 fallacy in question simulates. But there is a distinction to be first 

 drawn, which does not answer to any of the divisions of sound argu- 

 ments, but arises out of the nature of bad ones. We may know 

 exactly what our evidence is, and yet draw a false conclusion from it; 

 we may conceive precisely what our premisses are, what alleged mat- 

 ters of fact, or general principles, are the foundation of our inference ; 

 and yet, because the premisses are false, or because we have inferred 



