CLASSIFICATION OF FALLACIES. 455 



rather of arbitrary clioicr, not only to which genus each kind of lallacy 

 should ho referred, but even to which kind to roFer any one indiridual 

 fallacy ; for siiice, in any course of argument, One premiss is usually 

 suppressed, it freipuMitly happens in the case of a fallacy, that the hear- 

 ers are left to the alieniative uf supplying <v7/<tr a jireniiss which is 7iot 

 true, or else, one which docs not jirorc the conclusion: e.g., if a man 

 expatiates on the distress of the country, and thence argues that the 

 government is tyrannical, we must suppose him to assume eit/icr that 

 'every distressed country is under a tyranny,' which is a manifest 

 falsehood, or, merely that ' every ct>untry under a lynmny is distressed,' 

 which, however true, proves nothing, the middle term being undis- 

 tributed." The former wonld be ranked, in our distribution, among 

 fallacies of generalization, the latter among those of ratiocination, 

 ** Which arc we to suppose the speaker meant us to understand 1 

 Surely" (if he understood himself) "just whichever each of his hearers 

 might hapjien to prefer: some might assent to the false prcnjiss ; 

 others allow the unsound syllogism." 



Almost all fallacies, therefore, might in strictness be brought under 

 our tifth class, Fallacies of Confusion. A fallacy can seldom be abso- 

 lutely referred to any of the other classes ; we can only say, tliat if all 

 the links were filled up which should be capable of being supplied in 

 a valid argument, it would either stand thus (forming a fallacy of one 

 class), or thus (a fallacy of another) ; or at furthest we may say, that 

 tlie conclusion is most likeli/ to have originated in a fallacy of such 

 and such a class. Thus in Archbishop Whately's illustration, the 

 error committed may be traced with most probability to a falla(-y of 

 generalization; that of mistaking an uncertain mark, or piece of evi- 

 dence for a certain one ; concluding from an effect to some one of its 

 possible causes, when there are others which would have been equally 

 capable of producing it. 



Yet, though tlie five classes run into each other, and a particular 

 error often seems to be arbitrarily assigned to one of them rathor than 

 to any of the rest, there is considerable use in so distinguishing them. 

 We shall find it convenient to set apart, as Fallacies of Confusion, 

 those of which confusion is the most obvious characteristic ; in which 

 no other cause can be assigned for the mistake committed, than neg- 

 lect or inability to state the (piestion properly, and to aj)preliend the 

 evidence with definiteness and precision. In the remaining four 

 classes I shall place not only the comparatively few cases in which the 

 evidence; is clearly seen to be what it is, and yet a wrong conclusion 

 drawn from it, but also tlutse in which, although there be confusion, 

 the confusion is not the sole cause of the error, but there is some 

 shadow of a ground for it in the nature of the evidence itself. And in 

 distributing these cases of partial ccjufusion among the four classes, I 

 shall, when there can be any hesitation as to the jirecise seat of the 

 falla<y, suppose it to be in that part cjf the process in which from the 

 nature of the case, and the known infirmities of the human mind, an 

 error would in the particular circumstances be the most prcjbable. 



After these obsen'ations w<! shall ])roceed, without further pream- 

 ble, to consider the five classes in tlieir order. 



