FALLACIES OF SIMPLE INSPECTION. 467 



seek it by studying such notions." In his next chapter Mr. WIiowcll 

 has so well illustiated and exemplitied this error, that we shall take 

 the liberty of quoting him at some length. 



"The propensity," says he, "to seek for principles in the common 

 usages of language, may be discerned at a very early period. Thus 

 we have an example of it in a saying which is reported of Thales, the 

 founder of Greek philosophy. When he was asked, 'What is the 

 greatest thing?' he replied 'Plate; for all other thhigs arc i« the 

 world, but the world is //* it.' In Aristotle we have the consummation 

 of this mode of speculation. The usual point from which he starts in 

 his inquiries is, that wc say thus or thus in conmion language. Thus, 

 when he has to discuss the ([uestion whether tliere be, in any part of 

 the universe, a void, or space in which there is nothing, he incpiires first 

 in how many senses we say that one thing is in another. He enumer- 

 ates many of these ; we say the part is in the whole, as the finger is in 

 the hand ; again we say, the species is in the genus, as man is included 

 in animal; again, the government of Greece is in the king; and various 

 other senses are described and exemplified, but of all tliesc the most 

 proper is when we say a thing is in a vessel, and generally in place. 

 He next examines what j^l^ic*^ is, and comes to this conclusion, that ' if 

 about a body there be another body including it, it is in place, and if 

 not, not.' A body moves when it changes its place ; but he adds, that 

 if water be in a vessel, the vessel being at rest, the parts ofs^he water 

 may still move, for they are included by each other; so that while the 

 whole does not change its place, the parts may change their place in a 

 circular order. Proceeding then to the question of a void, he as usual 

 examines the different senses in which the term is used, and adopts, aa 

 the most proper, ^^ace without matter; with no Useful result." 



" Again, in a question concerning mechanical action, he says, ' When 

 a man moves a stone by pushing it with a stick, wc say both that the 

 man moves the stone, and that the stick moves the stone, but the latter 

 more properly.^ 



"Again, we find the Greek philosophers applying themselves to ex- 

 tract their dogmas from the most general and abstract notions which 

 they could detect ; for example, from the conception of the Universe 

 as One or as Many things. They D-ied to determine how far we may, 

 or must, combine with these conceptions that of a whole, of parts, of 

 number, of limits, of place, of begiiming or end, of full or void, of rest 

 or motion, of cause and effect, and the like. The analysis of such con- 

 ceptions with such a view, occupies, for instance, almost the whole of 

 Aristotle's Treatise on the Heavens." 



The following paragraph merits particular attention : — "Another 

 mode of reasoning, very widely applied in these attempts, was the doc- 

 trine of contrarieties, in which it was assumed, that adjectives or sub- 

 stantives which are in common language, or in some abstract mode of 

 conception, opposed to each other, nmst point at some fundamental 

 antithesis in nature, which it is important to study. Thus Aristotle 

 says, that the Pythagoreans, from the contntsts whi<-h number sug- 

 gests, collected ten principles — Limited and JJnIimitetl, Odd and Kven, 

 One and Many, Right and Left, Male find Female, iii'st and Motion, 

 Straight and Curved, Light and Darkness, Good and Evil, Square and 

 Oblong .... Aristotle himself deduced the doctrine of four elements and 

 6ther dogmas by oppositions of the same kind." 



