476 FALLACIES. 



looked or i-emainetl ignorant of the fact that in cases where the pre- 

 dictions had come true, he had been in collusion with some one who 

 had given him the information on which they were gi'ounded, this 

 would be non-obsei-vation of circumstances. 



The former case, in so far as the act of induction from insufficient 

 evidence is concerned, does not fall under this second class of Fallacies, 

 but under the third. Fallacies of Generalization. In every such case, 

 however, there are two defects or errors instead of one : there is the 

 eiTor of treating the insufficient evidence as if it were sufficient, which 

 is a Fallacy of the third class ; and there is the insufficiency itself; the 

 not having better evidence ; which, when such evidence, or m other 

 words, when other instances, were to be had, is Non-observation ; and 

 the erroneous inference, so far as it is to be attributed to this cause, is 

 a Fallacy of the second class. 



It belongs not to our puiiiose to treat of non-observation as arising 

 from casual inattention, from general slovenliness of mental habits, want 

 of due practice in the use of the obsei'ving faculties, or insufficient in- 

 terest in tlie subject. The question pertinent to logic is — Grranting 

 the want of complete competency in the obsei-ver, on what points 

 is that insufficiency on his paat likely to lead him wrong 1 or rather, 

 what sorts of instances, or of circumstances in any given instance, 

 are most likely to escape the notice of observers generally ; of mankind 

 at large 1 



§ 3. First, then, it is evident that when the instances on one side of 

 a question are more likely to be remembered and recorded than those 

 on the other ; especially if there be any strong motive to preserve the 

 memory of the hrst but not of the latter ; these last are likely to be 

 overlooked, and escape the observation of the mass of mankind. This 

 is the recognized explanation of the credit given, in spite of reason 

 and evidence, to many classes of imjjosters ; to quack doctors, and for- 

 tune-tellers in all ages ; to the " cimning man" of modem times, and 

 the oracles of old. Few have considered the extent to which this 

 fallacy operates in practice, even in the teeth of the most palpable 

 negative evidence. A striking example of it is the faith which the 

 uneducated portion of the agricultural classes, in this and other coun- 

 tries, continue to repose in the prophecies as to weather supplied by 

 almanac makers : although every season affords to them numerous 

 cases of completely erroneous prediction ; but as eveiy season also 

 furnishes some cases in which the prediction is verified, this is enough 

 to keep up the credit of the prophet, with people who do not reflect on 

 the number of instances requisite for what we have called, in our in- 

 ductive temiinology, the Elimination of Chance ; since a certain num- 

 ber of casual coincidences not only may but will happen, between any 

 two unconnected events. 



Coleridge, in one of the essays in the Friend, has very happily 

 illustrated the matter we are now considering, in discussing the origin 

 of a proverb, " which, differently worded, is to be found in all the 

 languages of Europe," viz., " Fortune favors fools." This proverb, 

 says he, " admits of various explanations. It may arise from pity, and 

 the soothing persuasion that Providence is eminently watchful over the 

 helpless, and extends an especial care to those who are not capable of 

 caring for themselves. So used, it breathes the same feeling as ' God 



