478 FALLACIES. 



This passage very happily sets forth the manner in which, under the 

 loose mode of induction which proceeds jier pnumerationeni simplicem, 

 not seeking for instances of sucli a kind as to be decisive of the ques- 

 tion, but generalizing from any which occur, or rather which are 

 remembered, opinions grow up with the apparent sanction of experi- 

 ence, which have no foundation in the laws of nature at all. " Itaque 

 recte respondit ille," (we may say with Bacon,*) "qui cum suspensa 

 tabula in templo ei monstraretur eorum, qui vota solverant, quod 

 naufragii periculo elapsi sint, atque interrogando premeretur, anna 

 tum quidem Deorum numen agnosceret, quaesivit denuo. At uhi sunt 

 illi depicti qui post vota nuncupata perieruntl Eadem ratio est fere 

 omnis superstitionis, ut in Astrologicis, in Somniis, Ominibus, Neme- 

 sibus, et hujusmodi ; in quibus, homines delectati hujusmodi vanitati- 

 bus, advertunt eventus, ubi implentur ; ast ubi fallunt, licet multo fre- 

 quentius, tamen negligunt, et praetereunt." And he proceeds to say, 

 that independently of the love of the marvelous, or any other bias in 

 the inclinations, there is a natural tendency in the intellect itself to this 

 kind of fallacy ; since the mind is more moved by affirmative instances, 

 altliough negative ones are of most use in philosophy : "Is tamen 

 humano intellectui error est proprius et perpetuus, ut magis moveatur 

 et excitetur Affirmativis, quam Negativis ; cum rite et ordine aequum 

 se utrique praebere debeat ; quin contra, in omni Axiomate vero con- 

 stituendo, major vis est instantiaj negativee." 



But the greatest of all causes of non-observation is a preconceived 

 opinion. This it is which, in all ages, has made the whole race of 

 mankind, and every separate section of it, for the most part unobser- 

 vant of all facts, however abundant, even v/hen passing under their own 

 eyes, which are contradictory to any first appearance, or any received 

 tenet. It is worth while to recall occasionally to the oblivious memory 

 of mankind, some of the striking instances in which opinions that the 

 simplest experiment would have shown to be erroneous, continued to 

 be entertained because nobody &ver thought of trying that experiment. 

 One of the most remarkable of these was exhibited in the Copernican 

 controversy. The opponents of Copernicus argued that the earth did 

 not move, because if it did, a stone let fall from the top of a high tower 

 would not reach the gi'ound at the foot of the tower, but at a little dis- 

 tance from it, in a contrary direction to the earth's course ; in the same 

 manner (said they) as, if a ball is let drop from the mast-head while 

 the shijj is in full sail, it does not fall exactly at the foot of the mast, 

 but nearer to the stern of the vessel. The Copernicans would hare 

 silenced these objectors at once if they had tried dropping a ball from 

 the mast-head, because they would have found that it does fall exactly 

 at the foot, as the theory requires: but no; they admitted the spurious 

 fact, and struggled vainly to make out a difference between the two 

 cases. " The ball was no ^;ar^ of the ship — and the motion forward 

 was not natural, either to the ship or to the ball. The stone, on the 

 other hand, let fall from the top of the tower, was n. part of the earth; 

 and therefore, the diurnal and annual revolutions which were natural 

 to the earth, were also natural to the stone ; the stone would, there- 

 fore, retain the same motion with the tower, and strike the ground pre- 

 cisely at the bottom of it."t 



* Nvo. Org., Aph. 46. t Playfaie's Dissertation, sect. 4. 



