FALLACIES OF GENERALIZATION. 187 



consciiueiit. The nioilc in which any one of the motions piodiurs the 

 next, nii^ht })ossil)ly be susceptible of explanation by some general 

 law ot" motion previou^^ly known; but the mode in which the last mo- 

 tion produces the sensation ol" color, cannot be explained by any law 

 of motion; it is the law of color; which is, and nnist always remain a 

 peculiar thing. Where our consciousness recognizes between two 

 phenomena an inherent distinction; where we are sensible of a dift'er- 

 ence which is not merely of degree, and feel that no adding one of the 

 phenomena to itself would jiroduce the other; any theory which 

 attempts to bring either under the laws of the other must be false; 

 though a theory which merely treats the one as a cause or condition of 

 the other, may possibly be true. 



§ 4. Among the remaining forais of erroneous generalization, sev- 

 eral of those most wtnthy of and most requiring notice have fallen under 

 our examination in former places, where, in investigating the rules of 

 correct induction, we have had occasion to advert to the distinction 

 between it and some common mode of the incorrect. In this number 

 is what I have formerly called. the natural Induction of unincjuiring 

 minds, the Induction of the ancients, which proceeds iter cnumcratio- 

 ncm simplkcm: "This, that, and the other A are B, I cannot think of 

 any A which is not E, therefore every A is B." As a final condem- 

 nation of this rude and slovenly mode of generalization, I will (]uote 

 Bacon's emphatic deimnciation of it ; the most important jiart, as I have 

 more than once ventured to assert, of tho permanent service rendered 

 by him to philosophy. "Inductio quae procedit per enumerationem 

 simplicem, res puerilis est, et pi'ccario concludit," (concludes only by 

 yuur leave, or provisionally,) " et periculo exponitur ab instantiii con- 

 tradictoria, et plerumque secundum pauciora quam par est, et ex his 

 tantummudo qu(e 2)rcesto sunt Y>ioi\\inc'va\.. At Inductio qute ad inven- 

 tionem et demonstrationem Scicntiarum et Artium erit utilis, Naturam 

 separare debet, per rejectiones et exclusiones debitas; ac deinde post 

 negativas tot quot sufticiunt, super aflinnativas concludere." 



I have aheady said that the uKjde of Simple Enumeration is still tho 

 common and received method of Inducti(»n in whatever relates to man 

 and society. Of this a very few instances, more by way of nu-mento 

 than of instruction, may suttice. What, for example, is to be thought 

 of all the " common-sense" maxims for which the following may serve 

 as the universal formula : " Whatsoever has never been, will never 

 be." As for example ; negroes have never been as civilized as whites 

 sometimes are, therefore it is imp«)ssibl(! they should be so. Women, 

 as a class, have not hitherto e()ualed men as a class in intellectual 

 energy and comprehensiveness, then-fore they are nece.ssarily inferior. 

 Society cannot prosper without this or the other institution ; e. g., in 

 Aristotle's time, without slavery ; in later times, witlumt an established 

 priesthood, without artificial distinctions of ranks, &c. One working 

 man in a thousand, educated, while the nine hundred and ninety-nine 

 remain uneducated, has usually aimed at raisiiii4 himself out of his 

 class, thercjfore education makes jieople <lissalisiied with tlieit (Condi- 

 tion in life. Booki.sh men, taken from speculative pursuits and set to 

 work on something they know nothing ab(»ut, have generally been 

 found or thought to do it ill ; therefore j)hilosnphers are unfit for busi- 

 ness, &c., &c. All those are inductions by simple enumeration. 



