FALLACIES OF CONFUSIO\. 503 



not in the miiLUc, bvit in one of the terms of the conclusion ; so that 

 the conchision (hawn sliall not be, in reality, at all warranted by tho 

 premisses, thoutjh it will appear to be so, by means of the grammatical 

 affinity of the words ; e. g. to bo acquainted with the guilty is a jyrc- 

 sumption of guilt ; this man is so acijuainted, therefore wc may presume 

 that he is guilty: this argument proceeds on the supposition of an 

 exact coiTespondence between presume and jiresumjttio/i, which, how- 

 ever, does not really exist ; for ' presumption' is commonly used to 

 express a kind of slight suspicion; whereas 'to presume' amounts to 

 absolute belief. There are innumerable instances of a non-corres- 

 pondence in paronymous words, similar to that above instanced ; as 

 between art and artful, design and designing, faith -and faithful, &;c., 

 and the more slight the variation of meaning, the more likely is the 

 fallacy to be successful ; for when the words have become so widely 

 removed in sense as ' pity' and ' pitiful,' every one would j)erceivo 

 such a fallacy, nor could it be employed but in jest.* 



" The present Fallacy," continues the Archbishop, " is nearly allied 

 to, or rather, perhaps, may be regarded as a branch of, that founded 

 on etymology ; viz., when a term is used, at one time in its customary, 

 and at another in its etymological sense. Perhaps no example of 

 this can be found that is more extensively and mischievously employed 

 than in the case of the word representative : assuming that its right 

 meaning must correspond exactly with the strict and original sense of 

 the verb ' represent,' thesophist persuades the multitude, that a member 

 of the House of Commons is bound to be guided in all points by the 

 opinion of his constituents ; and, in short, to be merely their spokes- 

 man: whereas law and custom, which in this case may be considered 

 a.s fixing the meaning of the term, require no such thing, but enjcjin the 

 representative to act according to the best of his own judgment, and on 

 his own responsibility." 



The following are instances, of great practical importance, in which 

 arguments are habitually founded upon a verbal ambiguity. 



The mercantile pul)lic are frequently led into this fallacy by the 

 phrase "scarcity of money." In the language of commerce "money" 

 has two meanings : cvrrcncy, or the circulating medium ; and capital 

 seeking imrestyncnt, especially investment on loan. In this last sense 

 the word is used when the "money market" is spoken of, and when 

 the " value of money" is said to be high or low, the rate of interest 

 being meant. The consequence of this ambiguity is, that as soon as 

 scarcity of money in the latter of these senses begins to be felt, as 

 soon as there is difficulty of obtaining loans, and the rate of interest is 

 high, it is concluded that this must arise from causes acting upon tho 

 quantity of money in the other and more popular sense ; that the 

 circulating medium must have diminished in quantity, or ought to bo 

 increased. I am aware that, independently of the double meaning of 

 the term, there are in the facts themselves some peculiarities, giving an 

 appaient support to this error ; but the ambiguity of the language 



* An example of this fallacy is the popular error that ttrong drink must be a cause of 

 strength. There is here fallacy within fallacy ; for granting that the wortls -'strong" and 

 "strength" were not (as they arc) applied in a totally diflbrcnt sense to fennenied liquor* 

 and to the human hody, there would still be involved the error of supposing that an effect 

 must be like its cause ; that the conditions of a phenomenon are likely to resemble the 

 phenomenon itself; which we have already treated of as an h priori fallacy of tho faat 

 rank. 



