FALLACIES OF CONFUSION. 513 



None of the modes of assuming what should be proved are in more 

 frequent use than what are termed by Beutham " question-begging 

 appelhitives ;" names which beg the question under the guise of stating 

 it. Tlie most potent of these are such as have a hiudatory or vituj)e- 

 rative character. For instance, in pohtics, the word Innovation. Tlie 

 dictionary meaning of this tei'm being merely " a change to something 

 new," it is difficult for the defenders even of the most salutary im- 

 provement to deny that it is an innovation ; yet the word having ac- 

 quired in common usage a vituperative connotation in addition to its 

 dictionary meaning, the admission is always constioied as a large con- 

 cession to the disadvantage of the thing proposed. 



The following passage from the argument in refutation of the Epi- 

 cureans, in the second book of Cicero Dc Finihus, affords a fine exam- 

 ple of this sort of fallacy. " Et quidem illud ipsum non nimium probo 

 (et tantum patior) philosophum loqui de cupiditatibus finiendis. An 

 potest cupiditas finiri ? tollonda est, atque exfrahcnda radicitus. Quis 

 est enim, in quo sit cupiditas, quin recte cupidus dici possit 1 Ergo et 

 avarus erit, sed finite: adulter, vcrum habcbit modum: et luxuriosus 

 eodem modo. Qualis ista philosophia est, qua^ non interitum affcrat 

 pravitatis, sed sit contenta mediocritate vitiorum ]" The (juestion was 

 whether certain desires, when kept within definite bounds, are vices 

 or not ; and the argument decides the point by applying to them a 

 word [cupiditas) which implies y\ce. It is shown, however, in the 

 remarks which follow, that Cicero did not intend this as a serious 

 argument, but as a criticism on what he deemed an inappropriate 

 expression. " Rem ipsam prorsus probo : elegantiam desidero. Ap- 

 pellet hoec dcsideria naturcB i cupiditatis nomen servet alio," &c. But 

 many persons, both ancient and modem, have employed this, or some- 

 thing equivalent to it, as a real and conclusive argument. We may 

 remark that the passage respecting cupiditas and cupidus is also an 

 example of another fallacy already noticed, that of Paronymous Terms. 



Many more of the arguments of the ancient moralists, and especially 

 of the Stoics, fall within the definition of Petitio Principii. In the Dc 

 Finibus, for example, which I continue to quote as being probably the 

 best extant exemplification at once of the doctrines and the methods of 

 the schools of Gi-eek philosophy existing at that time ; what arc wo to 

 think of the arguments of Cato in the third book, derived from comnnjn 

 notions : That if virtue were not happiness, it could not be a thing to 

 boast of: That if death or pain were evils, it woidd be impossible not 

 to fear them, and it covdd not, therefore, be laudable to despise them, 

 &c. In one way of viewing these arguments, they may be regarded 

 as appeals to the authority of the general sentiment of mankind, which 

 had stamped its approval upon certain actions and characters by the 

 phrases referred to ; but that such could have been the meaning in- 

 tended is very unlikely, considering the contempt of the ancient philo- 

 sophers for vulgar opinion. In any other sense they are clear cases of 

 Petitio Principii, since the word laudable, and tho idea of boasting, 

 imply pi'inciples of conduct ; and practical maxims can finly be proved 

 from speculative truths, namely, from the properties of the suljject 

 matter, and cannot, therefore, be employed to prove those properties. 

 As well might it be argued that a government is good beciiust^ we 

 ought to support it, or that there is a God because it is our duty to 

 pray to him. 

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