BOOK VI. 



ON THE LOGIC OF THE MORAL SCIENCES. 



" Une propriety fondamentale que jc dois fairc remarquer d^s ce moment dans cc que 

 i'ai appele la philosophic positive, et qui doit sans doiite lui meriter plus que toute autre 

 rattention gencrale, puisqu'elle est aujourd'hui la plus iinportante pour la pratique, c'est 

 qu'elle peut 6tre considcree comme la seule base solide de la reorRanisatioii sociale qui doit 

 tenniner I'etat de crise dans lequcl se trouvent depuis si long-temps les nations Ics plus 



civilisees Tant que les intelligences individuelles n'auront pas adherfe par un asscnti- 



ment unanime a un certain noinbre d'ldces generales capablesde former unc doctrine sociale 

 commune, on ne peut se dissimuler que I'ctat des nations restera.de toute nccegsitc,essen- 

 tiellement revolutionnaire, malgre tous les palliatifs poliliques qui pourront 6tre adoptds, et 

 ne comportera reeilement que des institutions provisoires. II est egalement certain que si 

 cette reunion des esprits dans une m^me communion de principes peut unc fois 6tre 

 obtenue, les institutions convenables en decouleront necessairement, sans donner lieu i 

 aucune secousse grave, le plus grand desordre 6tant dejk dissipe par ce seul fait." — Comtk, 

 Cows de Philosophie Positive, Ire le(^n. 



CHAPTER I. 



INTRODUCTORY KEM.ARKS. 



§ 1. Principles of Evidence anJ Theories of Method are not to be 

 constructed d priori. The laws of our rational faculty, like those of 

 every other natural agency, are only learnt by seeing the agent at 

 work. The earHcr achievements of science were made without the 

 conscious observance of any Scientific Method ; and we should never 

 have known by what process truth is to be ascertained, if we had not 

 previously ascertained many truths. But it was only the easier pro- 

 blems which could be thus resolved : natural sagacity, when it tried its 

 strength again.st the more difficult ones, cither failed altogether, or if 

 it succeeded here and there in obtaining a solution, had no sun- means 

 of convincing others that its solution was correct. In scientific in- 

 vestigation, as in all other works of human skill, the way of attaining 

 the end is seen as it were instinctively by superior minds in some 

 comparatively simple case, and is then, by judicious generalization, 

 adapted to the variety of complex cases. We learn to do a thing in 

 difficult circumstances, by attending to the manner in which we have 

 spontaneously done the same thing in easy ones. 



This truth is exemplified by the history of the various branches of 

 knowledge which have successively, in the ascending order of their 

 complication, ass-limed the character of sciences ; and will doubtless 

 receive fresh confirmation from those, of which the final scientific con- 

 stitution is y(;t to (;ome, and which are still abandoned to the uncer- 

 tainties of vague and popular discussion. Although several other sci- 

 ences have emerged fiom this state at a comparatively recent date, 



