522 LOGIC OF THE MORAL SCIENCES. 



and even degrading to the moral nature of man. Nor do I deny that 

 the docti-ine, as somethnes held, is open to these imputations ; for the 

 misapprehension in which 1 shall be able to show that they originate, 

 unfortunately is not confined to the opponents of the doctrine, but par- 

 ticipated in by many, perhaps we might say by most of its supporters. 



§ 2. Correctly conceived, the doctrine called Philosophical Neces- 

 sity is simply this : that, given the motives which are present to an 

 individual's mind, and given likewise the character and disposition of 

 the individual, the manner in which he will act may be uneningly 

 infeiTed ; that if we knew the person thoroughly, and knew all the 

 inducements which are acting upon him, we could foretell his conduct 

 with as much certainty as we can predict any physical event. This 

 proposition I take to be a mere interjjretation of universal experience, 

 a statement in words of what every one is internally convinced of No 

 one who believed that he knew thoroughly the circumstances of any 

 case, and the characters of ijie different persons concerned, would hes- 

 itate to foretell how all of them would act. Whatever degi-ee of doubt 

 he may in fact feel, arises from the uncertainty whether he really knows 

 the circumstances, or the character of some one or other of the persons, 

 with the degree of accuracy required ; but by no means from thinking 

 that if he did know these things, there could be any uncertainty what 

 the conduct would be. Nor does this full assurance conflict in the 

 smallest degi'ee with what is called our feeling of freedom. We do 

 not feel ourselves the less free, because those to whom we are intimately 

 known are well assured how we shall will to act in a particular case. 

 We often, on the contrary, regard the doubt what our conduct will be, 

 as a mark of ignorance of our character, and sometimes even resent 

 it as an imputation. It has never been admitted by the religious phi- 

 losophers who advocated the free-will doctrine, that we must feel not 

 free because God foreknows our actions. We may be fi-ee, and yet 

 another may have reason to be perfectly certain what use we shall 

 make of our freedom. It is not, therefore, the doctrine that our voli- 

 tions and actions are invariable consequents of our antecedent states 

 of mind, that is either contradicted by our consciousness, or felt to be 

 degrading. 



But the doctrine of causation, when considered as obtaining between 

 our volitions and their antecedents, is almost universally conceived as 

 involving more than this. Many do not believe, and very few prac- 

 tically feel, that there is nothing in causation but invariable, certain, 

 and unconditional sequence. There are few to whom mere constancy 

 of succession appears a sufficiently stringent bond of union for so pe- 

 culiar a relation as that of cause and effect. Even if the reason repu- 

 diates, imagination retains, the feeling of some more intimate connex- 

 ion, of some peculiar tie, or mysterious constraint exercised by the 

 antecedent over the consequent. Now this it is which, considered as 

 applying to the human will, conflicts with our consciousness, and re- 

 volts our feelings. We are certain that, in the case of our volitions, 

 there is not this mysterious constraint. We know that we are not 

 compelled, as by a magical spell, to obey any particular motive. We 

 feel, that if we wished to prove that we have the power of resisting 

 the motive we could do so, (that wish being, it needs scarcely be ob- 

 served, ^ new antecedent ;) and it would be'humiliating to our pride 



