ETHOLOGY. 539 



from direct observation, even sucli as Kepler's law, are mere aj)j)rox- 

 imations: the planets, owing to their perturbations by one another, do 

 not move in exact ellipses. Thus, even in astronomy, perfect exact- 

 ness in the mere empirical laws is not to be lot)kcd for ; nmch less, 

 then, in more complex subjects of in(iuiry. 



The same example shows how little can be inferred against the 

 universality or even the simplicity of the ultimate laws, from the im- 

 possibiHty of establishing any but approximate empirical laws of the 

 eifects. The laws of causation according to which a cIjlss of phenom- 

 ena are produced may be very few and simple, and yet the effects 

 themselves may be so various and complicated that it shall be impossi- 

 ble to trace any regularity whatever, extending compU-tely through 

 them. For the phenomena in question may be of an eminently modi- 

 fiable character ; insomuch that innumerable circumstances are capa- 

 ble of influencing the efi'ect, although they may all do it according to a 

 very small number of laws. Suppose that all which passes in the mind 

 of man is determined by a few simple laws : still, if those laws be such 

 that there is not one of the facts surroimding a human being, or of the 

 events which happen to him, that docs not influence in some mode or 

 degree his subsequent mental history, and if the circumstances of dil- 

 ferent human beings are extremely different, it will be no wonder if 

 very few propositions can be made respecting the details of their con- 

 duct or feelings, which will be true of all mankind. 



Now, without deciding whether the ultimate laws ofour mental nature 

 are few or many, it is at least certain that they are of the. above descrip- 

 tion. It is certain that our mental states, and our mental capacities 

 and susceptibilities, are modified, either for a time or permanently, by 

 everything which happens to us in life. Considering, therefiire, how 

 much these modifying causes differ in the case of any twc» individuals, 

 it would be unreasonable to expect that the empirical laws of the hu- 

 man mind, the generalizations we make respecting the feelings or ac- 

 tions of mankind without reference to the causes that determine them, 

 should be anything but approximate generalizations. They arc the 

 common wisdom of common life, and as such are invaluable ; espe- 

 cially as they are mostly to be applied to cases not very dissimilar to 

 those from which they were collected. But if maxims of this sort, col- 

 lected from Englishmen, come to be applied to Frenchmen, or col- 

 lected from the present day, are applied to past or future generations, 

 they are apt to be very much at fault. Unless we have resolved the 

 empirical law into the laws of the causes upon which it depends, and 

 ascertained that those causes extend to the case which we have in 

 view, there can be no reliance placed in our inferences. For every 

 individual is surrounded by circumstances different iroin those f>f every 

 otlier individual ; every nation or generation of mankind from every 

 other nation or generation : and none of these differences are without 

 their influence in forming a different type of character. There is, in- 

 deed, also a certain general resemblance ; but peculiarities of circum- 

 stances are continually constituting exceptions even to the projiositions 

 which are true in the great majority of cases. 



Althf>ugh, however, there is scarcely any mode of feeling or conduct 

 which is, in the absolute sense, common t(j all mankind ; and though 

 the generalizations which assert that any given variety of conduct or 

 feeling will be found universally (however nearly they may approxi- 



