THE GEOMETRICAL METHOD. 5r>7 



say anything cither in proof or in ilhistration of the assertion that such 

 is not the tiue diarac-ter of the social jilienomena. There is not, 

 among these most complex and (for that reason) most modiiiahle of 

 all phenomena, any one over which innuinerahle ft)rce8 do not exercise 

 influence ; which does not depend upon a conjunction of very many 

 causes. We have not, therefore, to prove the notion in question to be 

 an error, but to prove that the error has been committed ; that so mis- 

 taken a conception of the mode in which the plienomena of society 

 are produced, has actually been cntoitained. 



§ 2. One numerous division of the reasoners who have treated social 

 facts according to geometrical methoils, not admitting of any modifica- 

 tion of one law by another, must for the present be left out of onsider- 

 ation : because in them this error is complicated with, and is the cHect 

 of, another fundamental misconception, ot which we have already taken 

 some notice, and which will be trtvited of more fully before we con- 

 clude. 1 speak of those who deduce political conclusions* not from 

 laws of nature, not from sequences of phenomena, real or imaginary, 

 but from unbending practical maxims. Such, f(U- example, are all 

 who found their theories of politics upon what is called abstract right, 

 that is to say, upon universal precepts ; a pretension of which we have 

 already noticed the chimerical nature. Such, in like manner, arc those 

 who make the assumption of a social contract, or any other kind of 

 original obligation, and apply it to particular cases by mere interpre- 

 tation. But in this the fundamental error is the attempt to treat an art 

 like a science, and to have a deductive art ; the irrationality of which 

 will be sliown in a future chapter. It will be proper to take our ex- 

 emplification of the geometrical theory from those thinkers who have 

 avoided this additional error, and who entertain, so far, a juster idea 

 of the nature of political inquiry. 



We may cite, in the first instance, those who assume, as the princi- 

 ple of their political philosophy, that government is founded on fear; 

 that the dread of each other is the one motive by which human beings 

 were originally brought into a state of society, and are still held in it. 

 Some of the earlier scientitic incpiirers into politics, in particular 

 Hobbes, assumed this proposition, not by im])li( alioii, but avowedly, 

 as the foundation of their doctnne, and attempted to buihl a complete 

 philosophy of politics thereupon. It is ti'ue that Hobbes (who is so 

 much the most considerable of these, that we need not particularly ad- 

 vert to any of the rest) did not find this one maxim sufficient to carry 

 him thnmgh the whole of his sulyect, but wius obliged to eke it out by 

 the double sophism of an original contract. I call this a double 

 sophism; first, as passing off a fiction for a fact, and secondly, as as- 

 suming a practical principle, or precept, as the basis of a theory ; 

 which is a pelitio jtrmcipii, since (as we noticed in treating of that 

 Fallacy) every rule of conduct, even though it be so binding a one a« 

 the obsei-vance of a promise, must rest its own foundation.s upon the 

 theory of the subject, and the theory, therefore, cannot rest U))on it. 



§ 3. Passing over less important instances, I shall come at «mce to 

 the most remarkable example afforded by our owti times of the 

 geometrical method in politics ; emanating from persons who were 

 well aware of the distinction between Science and Art; who knew 



