558 LOGIC OF THE MORAL SCIENCES. 



that rules of conduct must follow, not precede, the ascertainment of 

 laws of nature, and that the latter, not the former, is the legitimate field 

 for the application of the deductive method. I allude to the interest- 

 philosophy of the Bentham school. 



The profound and original thinkers who are commonly known under 

 this description, founded their general theory of government upon one 

 comprehensive premiss, namely, that men's actions are always deter- 

 mined by their interests. There is an ambiguity in this last expres- 

 sion ; for, as tlie same philosophers, especially Bentham, systematical- 

 ly gave the name of an interest to anything which a person likes, the 

 proposition may be understood to mean only this, that men's actions 

 are always determined by their wishes. In this sense, however, it 

 would not bear out any of the consequences which these philosophers 

 di-ew from it: and the word, therefore, in their political reasonings, 

 must be understood to mean (which is also the explanation they them- 

 selves, on such occasions, gave of it) what is commonly termed pri- 

 vate, or worldly, interest. 



Taking the doctrine, then, in this sense, an objection presents itself 

 in limine which might be deemed a fatal one, namely, that so sweep- 

 ing a proposition is far from being universally true. Men are not 

 governed in all their actions by their worldly interests. This, how- 

 ever, is by no means so conclusive an objection as it at first appears ; 

 because in politics we are for the most part conceraed with the con- 

 duct not of individual men, but either of a series of men (as a succes- 

 sion of kings), or a body or mass of men, as a nation, an aristocracy, 

 or a representative assembly. And whatever is true of a large majori- 

 ty of mankind, may, without much error, be taken for true o^any suc- 

 cession of persons, considered as a whole, or of any collection of per- 

 sons in which the act of the majority becomes the act of the whole 

 body. Although, therefore, the maxim is sometimes expressed in a 

 manner unnecessarily paradoxical, the consequences drawn from it will 

 hold equally good if the assertion be limited as follows — Any succes- 

 sion of men, or the majority of any body of men, will be governed in 

 the bulk of their conduct by their personal interests. We are bound 

 to allow to this school of philosophers the benefit of this more rational 

 statement of their fundamental maxim, which moreover is in strict con- 

 formity to the explanations which, when considered to be called for, 

 have been given by themselves. 



The theory goes on to infer, correctly enough, that if the actions of 

 mankind are determined in the main by their selfish interests, the only 

 rulers who will govern according to the interest of the governed, are 

 those whose selfish interests are in accordance with it. And to this is 

 added a third proposition, namely, that no rulers have their selfish 

 interest identical with that of the governed, unless it be rendered so 

 by accountability, that is, by dependence upon the will of the governed. 

 In other words (and as the result of the whole), that the desire of retain- 

 ing or the fear of losing their power, and whatever is thereon consequent, 

 is the sole motive which can be relied on for producing, on the part 

 of rulers, a course of conduct in accordance with the general interest. 



We have thus a fundamental theorem of political science, consisting 

 of three syllogisms, and depending chiefly upon two general premisses, 

 in each of which a certain effect is considered as determined only by 

 one cause, not by a concurrence of causes. In the one, it is assumed 



