560 LOGIC OF THE MORAL SCIENCES. 



tity of interest between the sovereign and the majority of the peop]e 

 was probably stronger than it usually is in responsible governments ; 

 everything that the people had most at heart, the monarch had at heart 

 too. Had Peter the Great, or the rugged savages whom he began to 

 civilize, the truest inclination towards the things which were for the 

 real interest of those savages 1 



I am not here attempting to establish a theory of government, and 

 am not called upon to determine the proportional weight v/hich ought 

 to be given to the circumstances which this school of geometrical poli- 

 ticians left out of their system, and those which they took into it. I 

 am only concerned to show that their method was unscientific ; not to 

 measure the amount of error which may have affected their practical 

 conclusions. 



It is but justice to them, however, to remark, that their mistake was 

 not so much one of substance as of form ; and consisted in presenting 

 in a systematic shape, and as the scientific treatment of a great philo- 

 sophical question, what should have passed for that which it really 

 was, the mere polemics of the day. Although the actions of rulers are 

 by no means wholly determined by their selfish interests, it is as a 

 security against those selfish interests that constitutional checks are 

 required; and for that purpose such checks, in England, and in many 

 other countries, can in no manner be dispensed with. It is true, more- 

 over, that in the particular stage of civilization through which Europe 

 is now passing, either express or virtual responsibility to the governed 

 is the only means practically available to ci'eate a feeling of identity of 

 interest, in the cases, and on the points, where that feeling does not 

 sufficiently exist. To all this, and to the arguments which may be 

 founded upon it in favor of measures for the connection of our repre- 

 sentative system, I have nothing to object; but I confess my regret, 

 that the small though highly important portion of the philosophy of 

 government, which was wanted for the immediate purpose of serving 

 the cause of parliamentary reform, should have been held forth by phi- 

 losophers of such eminence as a complete theory. 



It is not to be imagined possible, nor is it true in point of fact, that 

 these philosophers regarded the few premisses of their theory as in- 

 cluding all that is required for explaining social phenomena, or for 

 determining the choice of forms of government and measures of legis- 

 lation and administration. They were too highly instructed, of too 

 comprehensive intellect, and some of them of too sober and practical 

 a character, for such an error. They would have applied and did 

 apply their principles with innumerable allowances. But it is not 

 allowances that are wanted. There is little chance of making due 

 amends in the superstructure of a theory for the want of sufficient 

 breadth in its foundations. It is unphilosophical to construct a science 

 out of a few of the agencies by which the phenomena are detennined, 

 and leave the rest to the routine of practice or the sagacity of conjec- 

 ture. We either ought not to pretend to scientific forms, or we ought 

 to study all the detennining agencies equally, and endeavor, so far as 

 it can be done, to include all of them within the pale of the science ; 

 else we shall infallibly bestow a disproportionate attention upon those 

 which our theory takes into accoimt, while we mis-estimate the rest, 

 and probably underrate their importance. That the deductions should 

 be from the whole and not from a part only of the laws of nature that 



