HISTORICAL METHOD. 577 



it cannot be relied upon for tlie prediction of future events, beyond, at 

 most, strictly adjacent cases. Now, M. Corate alono has seen thr 

 necessity of thus connectiiiiT all our irciieralizations from history with 

 the laws of human nature ; and he alone, therefore, lias arrivi-d at 

 any results truly scientific ; though in the speculations of others there 

 will be found many happy ajjcr^us, and valuable hints fur future 

 philosophers. 



§ 4. But, while it is an imperative rule never to introduce any 

 generalizations from histt)ry into the social science unless sullicient 

 grounds can be pointed out for it in hunuin nature, 1 do not tiiiiik any 

 one will contend that it would have been possible, setting out from the 

 principles of human nature and from the general circumstances of 

 man's position in the universe, to determine a priori the order in which 

 human development must take jilace, and to predict, coiis(«|Ucntly, 

 the general facts of liistory up to the present time. The initial stages 

 of human progress — when man, as yet unmodified by society, and 

 characterized only by the instincts resulting directly from his organi- 

 zation, was acted upon by outward objects of a comparatively simple 

 and universal character — might indeed, as M. Comle remarks, be 

 deduced from the laws of human nature ; which moreover is the only 

 possible mode of ascertaining them, since of that fonn of human ex- 

 istence no direct memorials are preserved. But (as he justly observes) 

 after the first few terms of the series, the influence exercised over each 

 generation by the generations which preceded it, becomes more and 

 more preponderant overall other influences; until at lengtli what we 

 now are and do, is in a very small degree the result of the universal 

 circumstances of the human race, or even of our own circumstances 

 acting through the original qualities of our species, but mainly of the 

 qualities produced in us by the whole previous history of humanity. 

 So long a .series of actions and reactions between Circumstances and 

 Man, each successive term being composed of an ever greater number 

 and vai-iety of parts, could not possibly be calculated from the elemen- 

 tary laws which produce it, by merely human faculties. The mere 

 length of the series would be a suflficient obstacle, since a slight error 

 in any one of the terms would augment in ra})id progression at every 

 subsequent step. 



If, therefore, the series of the efft'Cts themselves did not, when ex- 

 amined as a whole, manifest any retjularity, we should in vain attempt 

 to construct a general science of society. We must in tliat ca.sc have 

 contented ourselves with that subordinate order of sociological specu- 

 lation formerly noticed, namely, with endeavoring to ascertain what 

 would be the effect of the introduction of any new cause, in a state of 

 society supposed to be fixed ; a knowledge sufficient for most of the 

 ordinary exigencies of daily political practice, but liable to fail in all 

 cases in whicli the progressive movement of society is one of the in- 

 fluencing elements ; and therefore more precarious in proportion as 

 the case is more important. But since b(»th the natural varieties of 

 mankind, and the original diversities of local circumstances, are much 

 less considerable than the points of agreement, there will naturally be 

 a certain degiee of uniformity in the progiessive development of man 

 and of his works. And this uniformity (as M. Comte remarks with 

 much justice) tends to become greater, not less, as society advances j 

 4D 



