HISTORICAI, METHOD. 585 



tanenus cnder, far more iioarly approacliint; to tlie n-al onl<«r of tlioir 

 filiation than couM ho <)l)taint'il liy any oilier merely empirical |irocc88. 



Now, tlie ovidenre of liisl«)ry uiul the eviileiice of human nature 

 combine, by a most striking instance of consilience, to nbow that there 

 is really one social element which is tlnis predominant, and almost 

 paramount, amonp; the agents of the social progression. This is, tlio 

 state of the speculative faculties of mankind ; incbxling the natiu'e of 

 the sjieculative beliefs which by any means tlu-y havt- arrived at, con- 

 cerning themselves and the world by which they are surr«)unded. 



It would be a great error, and one very little likely to b<' committed, 

 to assert that speculation, intellectual activity, the pursuit of truth, ia 

 among the more powerful propensities of human nature, or fills a large 

 place in the lives of any, save decidedly exceptional individuals. But 

 notwithstanding the relative weakness of this jirinciple among other 

 sociological agents, its inlluence is the main determining cause of the 

 social progress ; all the otlier dispositions of our nature which con- 

 tribute to that progress, being dependent upon it for the means of 

 accomplishing their share of the work. Thus (to take the most obvious 

 case first), the impelling force to most of the improvejnents effected in 

 the arts of life, is the desire of increased material condbrt ; but as we 

 can only act upon external objects in proportion to our knowledge of 

 them, the state of knowledge at any time is the impassable limit of 

 the industrial improvements possible at that time ; and the progress of 

 industry must follow, and depend upon, the progress of knowledge. 

 The same thing may be shown to be true, though it is not cpiite so 

 obvious, of the progress of the fine arts. Further, as the strongest 

 propensities of human nature (being tlie purely selfish ones, and those 

 of a sympathetic character which partake most of the nature of selfish- 

 ness) evidently tend in themselves to disunite mankind, not to unite 

 them — to make them rivals, not confederates; social existence is only 

 possible by a disciplining of those more powerful propi'Tisities, which 

 consists in subordinating them to a cominon system of oj)inions. The 

 degree of this subordination is the measure of the completeni-ss of the 

 social union, and the nature of the common opinions d(>termines its 

 kind. But in order that mankind should conform their actions to any 

 set of opinions, these opinions must exist, must be believed by them. 

 And thus, the state of the speculative faculties, the character of the 

 propositions assented to by the intellect, essentially determines the 

 moral and political state of the community, as we have already seen 

 tliat it determines the physical. 



These conclusions, deduced from the laws of human nature, are in 

 entire accordance with the gtmend facts of history. Every considera- 

 ble change histoiically knowTi to us in the condition of any portion of 

 mankind, ha.s been pn;ceded by a (change, of proportional extent, in 

 the state of their knowledge, or in their prevalent beliefs. As between 

 any given state of speculation, and the conelative state of everything 

 else, it was almost always tin; former which first showed itself; th<»ugh 

 the effects, no doubt, reacted potently upon the cause. Every con- 

 siderable advance in material civilization has been preceded by an 

 advance in knowledge; and when any great social change has come 

 to pass, a great change in the opinions and modes of thinkiiiLf of society 

 had taken place shortly before. Polytheism, .Judaism, Christianitif, 

 Protestantism, the negative philosophy of modem Europe, and its 

 4E 



