LOGIC OF PRACTICE, OU ART. 591 



the sovereignty of the people (for example) must be a right fttuiulation 

 for goveninumt, because a government thus t^onstituted tentls tit pro- 

 duce certain beneficial effects. Inasmuch, however, as nci gt)vcnunent 

 produces all possible beneficial effects, but all are attended with more 

 or fewer inconveniences; and since thcsj; cannot be combati^d by 

 means drawn from the very causes which produce them; it would bo 

 often a much stronger recommendation of some practical arrangemi.mt, 

 that it does not follow from what is called the general principle <»f the 

 government, than that it does. Under a government of legitimacy, the 

 presumption is far rather in favor of institiitions of popular origin; and 

 in a democracy, in favor of arrangements tending to check the impetus 

 of popular will. The line of argumentation so commonly mistaken in 

 France for political philosophy, tends to the practical conclusion that 

 wc should exert our utmost ettbrts to aggravates, instead of alleviating, 

 whatever are the characteristic imperfections of the system of institu- 

 tions which we prefer, or under which we happen to live. 



§ 5. The Logic of Art (it appears from all that has now been said) 

 consists essentially of this one principle, that intpiiry and discussion 

 should take place on the field of^ science alone. The rules of art are 

 required to conform to the conclusions of science, not to principles or 

 premisses of its own. 



An Art, or a body of Art, consists of the rules, together with as 

 much of the speculative propositions as comprises the justification of 

 those rules. The complete art of any matter, includes a selection of 

 such a portion finom the science, as is necessary to show on what con- 

 ditions the effects, which the art aims at producing, depend. And Art 

 in general, consists of the truths of Science, arranged in the most con- 

 venient order for practice, instead of the order which is the most con- 

 venient for thought. Science gi'oups and arranges its truths so as to 

 enable us to take in at one view as hnuch as possible of the general order 

 of the universe. Art, though it must assume the same general laws, 

 follows them only into such of their detailed conse(|uences as have led 

 to the fomiation of rules of conduct; and brings together from parts of 

 the field of science most remote from one another, the truths relating 

 to the production of the different and heterogeneous conditions neces- 

 sary to each effect which the exigencies of practical life require to bo 

 produced. 



On this natural difference between the order of the propositions of 

 Science and those of Art (science following one cause to its various 

 effects, while art traces one effect to its multiplied and diversified 

 causes and conditions), a principle may be grounded, which has b(;en 

 suggested \vith his usual sagacity, but not dwelt upon or accompanied 

 with the necessary explanations, by M. Comte. It is, that there ought 

 to be a set of intermediate scientific truths, derived from the higher 

 generalities of science, and destined to serve as the geiwralla or first 

 principles of the various arts. The scientific operation of framing 

 these intei-mediate principles, M. Comte considers as one of those re- 

 sults of pliilo.sophy which are reserved for futurity. The only c(»m- 

 plete example which he can point out as actually realized, and which 

 can be held up as a type 'to be imitated in more important matters, is 

 the general theory of the art of Descriptive (letjmetry, as conceived by 

 M. Moufi^e. It is not, however, difhcult to understand what the naturo 



