46 Sorse Racing. 



on tlie part of the seller that his statements re- 

 specting the horse were true and correct, should 

 form a part of the bargain between them. It 

 need hardly be suggested that for the sake of 

 disputes, whenever a warranty is intended it will 

 be prudent to have it put into writing. 



A mere representation, as distinguished from 

 a warranty, forms no part of the contract — it 

 amounts merely to an assertion of that which is 

 represented, with an intimation, expressed or im- 

 plied, of the seller's belief that what he so asserts 

 is true. 



The difference, in short, is between a jpro- 

 mise that the statements or representations are 

 true, and a mere expression of belief that they 

 are so. 



Those who desire to read a case which has 

 been determined in the Court of Common Pleas, 

 fully illustrating the distinction which has been 

 pointed out, will find such a case in Hopkins v. 

 Tanqueray, 15 Common Bench Keports, 130. 



An erroneous statement by the seller touching 

 the horse or his engagements, or any unpaid 

 stakes or forfeits due for him, or even a total 

 omission to mention such engagements or unpaid 

 stakes or forfeits, does not necessarily vitiate the 

 sale and entitle the purchaser to return the horse, 



