146 THE SCOPE OF MIND. 



Desire, and which exist (d) as the incitations to, or 

 accompaniments of, Volitional Action. But, if this he 

 true, what becomes of the metaphysical entity callerl 

 * Mind ' ? 



Thus, it would appear that, if we are, as so many 

 philosophers tell us, to regard the sphere of Mind as 

 co-extensive with the sphere of Consciousness, we should 

 find *Mind' reduced to a mere imperfect, disjointed, 

 serial agglomeration of feelings and conscious states of 

 various kinds — while the multitudes of initial or inter- 

 mediate nerve actions (which serve to bind those other 

 nerve actions commonly associated with conscious corre- 

 latives into a complex, continuous and coherent series) 

 would have no claim to be included under this category. 



For these and other reasons, we feel ourselves driven 

 to the conclusion that the common notion as to what 

 should be included under the term Mind, is one which is 

 altogether erroneous, and such notion ought clearly enough 

 to be given up, unless some warrantable extension of the 

 meaniijg of the narrower term Consciousness should per- 

 mit the rectification to be made in this direction. 



It would seem to most persons impossible so to widen 

 the signification of the word Consciousness, as to make it 

 co-extensive with unconscious nerve actions, though some 

 such proposition seems suggested by Professor Bain when 

 he says :* *' We assume as a fundamental fact, that with 

 nervous action feeling begins." This is certainly a large 

 assumption, and one which it is ditticult to admit, though 

 a notion of the same kind was, several years ago, advocated 

 by G. II. Lewes, t who holds steadfastly to the notion that 

 sensibility is the property of ganglionic nerve tissue in 

 general, even though the action of such ganglionic tissue 

 * *• Mind and Body," p. 53. f " Physiology of Common Life.'* 



