182 SENSATION, IDEATION, 



or Feeling the same analogy holds good, and within itself; 

 for in this case, where the sense is diifused throughout 

 the body, the subjective and the objective vary in their 

 proportions at different parts. The parts most subjectively 

 sensible, those chiefly susceptible of pain and pleasure, 

 furnish precisely the obtusest organs of touch ; and the 

 acutest organs of touch do not possess, if ever even that, 

 more than an average amount of subjective sensibility." 



Sensation is, in fact, a complex rather than a simple 

 mental process. It is invariably compounded of Cogni- 

 tion and Feeling. 



That there is a discriminative or 'intellectual' side to even 

 the most subjective of our Sensations is fully admitted 

 by Hamilton and others. Any Sensation, however simple, 

 can only be recognized as such — can only become an 

 element of our Consciousness, (<x) by the simultaneous 

 memory or revival of some past impressions, (b) by the 

 intuitive recognition of their likeness or unlikeness to the 

 present impression, and (c) by the similar recognition that 

 this is felt as in a certain place. This holds good even for 

 Touches and Tastes which are habitually referred to 

 some part of that inner circle of the Non-Ego, repre- 

 sented by the organism's own body. And in reference to 

 such Odours, Sounds, and Sights as are referred to the 

 outside world beyond the organism, it becomes plainly 

 impossible to attempt to preserve any real distinction ho- 

 tween Sensations and Perceptions — since precisely the same 

 mental processes are involved in both. Thus, according to 

 Sir William Hamilton, Perception also is *' an Assertory 

 Judgment, that within the sphere of sense an object 

 exists, and exists thus or tlms conditioned.^' The number 

 of the ' conditions' may, of course, vary greatly, but without 

 altering the real nature of the process. Indeed he subse- 

 quently says, "It is manifestly impossible to discriminate, 



