Chap. XII.] AND PERCEPTION. 183 



with any rigour, Sense from Intellect; " and after calling 

 attention to the similar opinion held by Aristotle, adds 

 these words, " Sensitive apprehension is, in truth, only the 

 recognition by Intelligence of the phenomena presented in 

 or through its organs." 



It seems plain, therefore, that a gradual transition may 

 be traced between simple Sensations and the most elabo- 

 rate Perceptions ; that there is a difference in degree, 

 rather than in kind, between these two processes ; and 

 that James Mill, in his " Analysis of the Human Mind," 

 was not without justification in making no use of the latter 

 term, and in speaking merely of 'simple ' and of 'complex' 

 Sensations. Moreover, it must be steadfastly borne in 

 mind, that in every complex Sensation (or Perception) of 

 an external object, there occurs an embodied cluster of 

 judgments and inferences, similar in kind to those which 

 compose the basis of all Intellectual Action. Thus the 

 notion that an intellectual element enters into the very 

 groundwork of all Sensations is so well founded as to make 

 it not at all surprising that such an opinion should have 

 been held alike by ancient and by more modern philosophers. 



It will be probably far less difficult for the general reader 

 to acknowledge the fact of the close genetic relations 

 existing between Sensations and those complex states of 

 feeling known as Emotions, than for him to recognize the 

 relationship, above pointed out, between Sense and Intel- 

 lect. This is natural enough, because those who have not 

 reflected or read much on these subjects, are apt not 

 adequately to appreciate the importance of the Intellectual 

 element in all Sensations, though they may have little 

 difficulty in recognizing that Sensation and Emotion are 

 merely different kinds of Feeling. It will not, therefore, 

 at present, be necessary to dwell long upon this latter 

 aspect of the problem as to the genesis of Mind. 



