184 SENSATION, IDEATION, 



We may safely assume it to be admitted, as a general 

 truth, that Emotions of various kinds gradually mani- 

 fest themselves and gain in strength, as the sensorial 

 endowments of animals, and their relational correspondence 

 with their environment, increase in definiteness and com- 

 plexity. ' Pleasures' and * pains' soon begin to be realized 

 as direct results of their various movements and sensorial 

 activities, and from the traces of these which survive in 

 the form of nascent and clustered memories of many 

 related sensations, those numerous, vague, but all-powerful 

 modes of Feeling, commonly known as Emotions, take 

 their origin, and often seem to increase in strength as 

 the wealth of associations from which they are derived 

 becomes organized and widened in successive genera- 

 tions of animals. The revival of such vague clustered 

 memories of ' pleasures * or ' pains ' usually follows as a 

 direct result of some Perception. An impression made 

 upon some organ of sense may thence reverberate through 

 the brain so as to produce a Perception of the correspond- 

 ing object, and may simultaneously evoke some distinctly 

 related Emotion.* 



This double or two-sided nature of Sensation, and the 

 necessary development from it of the germs of Intellect 

 on the one side, and of Emotion on the other, as from a 

 common root, is a fact of the greatest interest from a 

 physiological as well as from a philosophical point of view. 

 We must perforce admit that every kind of Sensation hns 

 two distinct though closely related sides, the one of which, 

 as mere Feeling, reveals the mode of affection of the E(/(- ; 

 while the other, as Discrimination or Cognition, reveals 

 the relations and qualities of what we call the Non-Ego. 



* On the subject of the genesis of Ere.otioTi, the reaaer may 

 consult a chapter in Herbert Spencer's " Principles of Psy- 

 chology," vol. i. pp. 481-494 



