420 FROM BRUTE 



of the presentation of sense or representation of imagmation 

 which we are conscious of. Now, what is there to mate ns do this ? 

 There must be something which, as often as it recurs either to our 

 senses or to our thoughts, directs our attention to those particular 

 elements in the perception or in the idea : and whatever performs 

 this office is virtually a sign ; but it need not be a word : the 

 process certainly takes place to a limited extent, in the inferior 

 animals ; and even in human beings who have but a small voca- 

 bulary, many processes of thought take place habitually by other 

 symbols than words. It is a doctrine of one of the most fertile 

 thinkers of modern times, Auguste Comte, that besides the logic 

 of signs, there is a logic of images, and a logic of feelings. In 

 many of the -familiar processes of thought, and especially in uncul- 

 tured minds, a visual image serves instead of a word. Our visual 

 eensations — perhaps only because they are almost always present 

 along with the impressions of our other senses — have a facility of 

 becoming associated with them. Hence the cnaracteristic visual 

 appearance of an object easily gathers round it, by association, the 

 ideas of all other peculiarities which have, in frequent experience, 

 coexisted with that appearance: and summoning up these with a 

 strength and certainty far surpassing that of the merely casual 

 associations, which it may also raise, it concentrates the attention 

 on them. This is an image ^serving for a sign — the logic of 

 images. The same function may be fulfilled by a feeling. Any 

 strong and highly interesting feeling, connected with one attribute 

 of a group, spontaneously classifies all objects according as they 

 possess or do not possess that attribute. We may be tolerably 

 certain that the things capable of satisfying hunger, form a per- 

 fectly diw-inct class in the mind of any of the more intelligent 

 animals ; quite as much so as if they were able to use or understand 

 the word food." \. 



Whilst it seems possible, therefore, that simple 

 General Notions may be formed around and called up 

 by Feelings, and consequently by the Images of these 

 (and especially by Visual Images), it is also clear that 

 Words are much more potent Signs, since in addition to 

 the aid which they aftbrd in the formation of General 

 Notions, thoy carry with them the power of being used 

 as means of communicating Thoughts, and, therefore, of 



