424 FROM BRUTE 



specially designate as Thought, i.e, that logical function 

 which deals with generalities, ratios, symbols, as Feeling 

 deals with particulars and objects, a fnnctlon sustained 

 hy and subservient to impersonal, social ends. Taking 

 Intelligence in general as the discrimination of means to 

 ends — the guidance of the Organism towards the satisfac- 

 tion ol its impulses — we particularize Intellect as a highly 

 differentiated mode of this function, namely, as the 

 discrimination of symbols. This differs from the rudi- 

 mentary mode, out of which it is nevertheless an eyolution, 

 as European Commerce differs from the rudimentary 

 Barter of primitive tribes. Commerce is impossible 

 except under complex social conditions out of which it 

 springs ; and its operations are mainly carried on by 

 means of symbols which take the place of objects ; the 

 bill of invoice represents the cargo ; the merchant's signa- 

 ture represents the payment. In like manner Intellect is 

 impossible until animal development has reached the 

 human social stage ; and it is at all periods the index of 

 that development ; its operations are likewise carried on 

 by means of symbols (Language) which represent real 

 objects, and can at any time be translated into feelings 

 . . . between the extremes of human Intelligence — say a 

 Tasmanian and a Shakespeare — there are infinitesimal 

 gradations, enabling us to follow the development of the 

 one into the other, without the introduction of any essen- 

 tially new factor. But between animal and human Intel- 

 ligence there is a gap, which can only be bridged over by 

 an addition from without. That bridge is the Language 

 of symbols, at once the cause and effect of Civilization." 



Again,, the same writer remarks*: — "An animal 

 suffers from a physical calamity, seeks to escape from it, 



* Log. cit. pp. 1(58, 169. 



