APPENDIX. 693 



pathological as well as psychological data, re-affirms the same kind 

 of view as that of Hamilton (doubted by Bain) in reference to the 

 existence of impressions yielding feelings of tension coming from 

 the muscles by sensory nerves ; only, instead of regarding (with 

 Hamilton) these impressions as subsidiary, he deems them all-im- 

 portant, and denies that our notions of resistance, weight, &c., can 

 be derived from any mer^ cerebral process, or, indeed, from any 

 other source than the moving parts themselves. He says : — " The 

 ego has a direct consciousness of the phenomena of volition; it 

 knows immediately that there has been a voluntary stimulus, and 

 to what part of the body it is directed ; as to the effects produced 

 it is only mediately informed of these and can disregard them 



The nervous action which incites the movement can only, 



therefore, furnish to consciousness an idea of the volition, and not 



that of its execution It is necessary that the effect of 



the central incitation (the contraction) should be produced in order 

 that the brain may perceive, and then it perceives, at the same 

 time, both the seat and the degree of contraction. The movement 

 itself is, therefore, the source whence we derive notions of this hind." 

 This latter part of the view of Landry, adverse to the notions of 

 Miiller, Hamilton, Ludwig and others, in regard to the ' locomotive 

 faculty,' was about the same time indejDendently affirmed by G. H. 

 Lewes ('Physiol, of Common Life,' vol. ii. 1860), though in regard 

 to the mode in which we derive our impressions from the moving 

 members, Lewes, in part, introduced us to a new view — based how- 

 ever, upon very debatable grounds. He deemed it an error to reg;i rd 

 the nerves of the anterior and of the posterior roots as essentially 

 distinct in function : the fibres of each, he contended, are both sen- 

 sory and motor — that is capable of transmitting ingoing impres- 

 sions as well as outgoing stimulations, though they may minister 

 to these functions in different proportions. The kind of sensibility 

 to which motor nerves diiectly contribute (by conveying impres- 

 sions backwards from muscle to motor centre) must, Lewes thought, 

 " be that of what we call the Muscular Sense, by which we adjust 

 the manifold niceties of contraction required in our movements.'* 

 "The body is balanced," he added, "by an incessant shifting of the 

 muscles, one group antagonizing the other. But this would be 

 impossible, unless each muscle were adjusted and co-ordinated by 

 sensation." Lewes admits, however, that such sensations do not 

 much "emerge into that prominence which causes the mind to attend 

 to them," and he cites Schiff as holding the view that " all the pheno- 

 mena {i.e., conscious impressions) attributed to the muscuiui scnso 



