598 APPENDIX. 



such return they must operate their properties in accordance with the provi- 

 sions of the statute forbidding discrimination between localities and charging 

 more for the short than for the long haul. 



928. The public right to a just relation of rates between rival communities 

 arises from the statute which forbids discriminating charges, and that right 

 cannot be abridged or enlarged by agreements of carriers with each other, nor 

 by promises made to shippers. 



935. Although the act to regulate commerce requires that transportation 

 charges shall be reasonable and just, and complainant prayed in his petition 

 that defendants be ordered to establish and maintain such rate on coal in car- 

 loads from Cumberland, Md., to North Garden, Va. , as should be deemed just, 

 reasonable, and lawful, the act as recently interpreted by the courts, makes 

 no provision under which carriers can be required or ordered to maintain any 

 rate other than such rate of charges as any such carrier may fix and establish 

 for itself. 



941. Wrongs caused by improperly adjusted rates over independent lines 

 from competing cities to a common destination cannot be corrected without 

 authority to prescribe both a maximum and minimum rate, and the Commission 

 is not empowered to do either. 



960. Any person or association is entitled to complain before the Commis- 

 sion of any failure on the part of carriers to publish and enforce transportation 

 or terminal charges, rules, and regulations, and that such failure results from 

 special privileges allowed to shippers on many important lines. 



967. Ptailroad companies are not prohibited by section 3 of the act from 

 preferring one locality over another, unless the preference is undue or unreason- 

 able, but a preference which is without legitimate excuse, is, in and of itself, 

 unreasonable. 



969. Carriers frequently disregard distance in making their rates, and they 

 may lawfully do so under some circumstances; but distance should be regarded 

 wherever possible, and no previous decision is authority for a ruling that a 

 carrier may be compelled to disregard it for the purpose of placing two com- 

 munities upon a commercial equality. 



980. The exaction of as high rates for a shorter haul as for a longer haul 

 over the same line in the same direction, the shorter haul being included within 

 the longer, is itself a discrimination, and, if not justified by a substantial dis- 

 similarity of circumstances and conditions, is an unjust discrimination. 



981. In respect to competition as justifying discrimination, the Supreme 

 Court of the United States has only gone to the extent of holding that it " may 

 in some cases " be such as " having due regard to the interests of the public 

 and of the carrier, ought, justly, to'have effect upon rates," and that the mere 

 fact of competition, no matter what its character or extent," does not neces- 

 sarily relieve carriers from the restraints of the third and fourth sections of 

 the act to regulate commerce. 



982. The Supreme Court of the United States, while denying power in the 

 Interstate Commerce Commission to enforce the provision of section 1 of the 

 act to regulate commerce, namely, that all charges shall be reasonable and 

 just — by orders prescribing reasonable maximum rates, expressly recognizes the 

 authority and duty of the Commission to enforce sections 2, 3, and 4 of the act. 



2. EXTRACTS FROM THE REPORT OF THE INTERSTATE COM 

 MERCE COMMISSION FOR 189S. 



After stating that the Commission, in former reports, has called the atten- 

 tion of Congress to the vital defects of the act to regulate commerce, and has 

 thereby performed its full duty, the report goes on to say : — 



" Meanwhile the situation has become intolerable, both from the standpoint 

 of the public and the carriers. Tariffs are disregarded, discriminations con- 



