178 ORGANIZATION AND LIFE. 



ism also for that arrangement of matter into the 

 peculiar state explained in protoplasm, and with him 

 the word " organization " means the process by which 

 a being possessed of organs is formed not the result of 

 the process. With this distinction between action and 

 function, and organism and organization, we escape the 

 confusion into which Mr. Spencer frequently falls, as 

 well as Professor Huxley when he speaks of the rhizo- 

 poda exhibiting " life without organization " this 

 last word meaning no doubt structure palpable to our 

 senses. The truth is the so-called evolutionists like H. 

 Spencer and Hackel are perpetually hampered in their 

 definition of life by their desire to explain away the 

 unfathomable gulf fixed between vital and all chemical 

 actions, and thus to leave open a way for the origin of 

 life from natural chemical processes, while Fletcher 

 a vitalist although not a vital principlist as well as 

 Beale and all the vital principlists are content to leave 

 it unexplained. Beale's objections'* to the definition 

 of life as the sum of the action of living beings do not 

 apply to Fletcher, who had already limited life to the 

 action of the protoplasm alone. 



The question now presses whether our previous 

 knowledge of the chemical properties of matter gives 

 us reason to suppose it possible that such remarkable 

 powers as those of life can be the attribute of any mere 

 combination of matter. In addition to what has been 

 .said on this point by Mr. H. Spencer and Dr. Bastian, 

 I have brought together -f the chief facts in evidence 

 of thejufluence of not only chemical combination, but 



, * "Protoplasm," 3rd edit. p. 74. 

 t For part iii. of " Life and the Equivalence of Force." 



