BE ALE'S DENIAL OF VITALITY AS A PROPERTY. 229 



party profess they do not know to what extent the 

 properties of matter may be developed even to the 

 extent of producing the phenomena of life while the 

 other, Beale and the vital- prineiplists, profess to know 

 with certainty that a new principle is required. Under 

 these circumstances, we read with surprise the con- 

 clusion of Beale 's chapter vii. of 3d edition of " Proto- 

 plasm." "Any one who will contemplate such an 

 arrangement of tissues as that which may be demon- 

 strated in a specimen like the one figured [tongue of 

 Hyla], will not rest satisfied with attributing it to the 

 ' properties ' of the elements entering into the chemical 

 composition of the substances out of which it has been 

 made. The l property ' hypothesis accounts for abso- 

 lutely nothing. Its advocates are unable to explain 

 how one of the tissues has grown into the form it 

 ultimately takes, how it acquired its structure, or how 

 it came into relation with adjacent textures. No 

 wonder the disciples of 'property' philosophy pride 

 themselves upon the interest they take in the broad 

 general features, and try to make the public believe 

 that they have reason to look down upon minute 

 details and contemptuously disregard the facts demon- 

 strated by those who study the structure of the bodies 

 of living beings. 



' The simple fool is he who knows that he'does not know, 

 The compound fool is he who does not know that he does 

 not know.' " 



I apprehend that Fletcher belongs not to the second 

 category, though he need not be ashamed to be classed 

 with the many wise, and good, and great who confess 

 to the first. 



