NO MECHANICAL EQUIVALENCE. 231 



question of the relation of mind to matter, and I ap- 

 prehend they are in harmony with what is expressed, 

 but not better expressed, by the majority of philoso- 

 phical thinkers of this day. I do not propose to enter 

 on the vast and intricate question of the nature of 

 mind, but merely to comment on the relation of one of 

 its phenomena, viz., Consciousness, to force. We may 

 pass by a large number of truly mental phenomena as 

 not being necessarily attended with consciousness, and 

 in these the relation of the transformation of Energy, 

 or the doing of work, is probably the same as obtains 

 in ordinary vital or metabolic action, viz., the ingo of 

 force through stimuli and pabulum exactly balances 

 the outgo in the form of heat, mechanical movement, 

 and the potential energy still remaining in the living 

 matter, or its products, while nothing is counted for 

 the peculiar properties given by the state of organism. 

 All the discharges of the reflex and coinmissural 

 stimuli which are essential to bring into play the 

 numerous elements of the very simplest act of thought, 

 whether conscious or not, and the forcing the atoms 

 into new positions, implied probably by memory, and 

 all expression of thought and emotion, whether by 

 voluntary or involuntary movement, or by sympathetic 

 stimulation, have to do with work obviously enough. 

 But it is with consciousness that the true difficulty 

 lies. Is it allowable to suppose that with each act of 

 consciousness there is a consumption of a given amount 

 of energy and reappearance of it again, as heat, or 

 other mode of force, on the cessation of consciousness ? 

 Can we admit the propriety of Mr. Huxley's expres- 

 sion, " the mechanical equivalent of consciousness ?" I 



