LEIBNITZ'S MONADOLOGIE. 



stimuli. Consciousness is thus here stated to be quite 

 inexplicable by all that is otherwise known of the 

 reactions of matter and force, and therefore referred to 

 a new manifestation of the properties of matter in the 

 peculiar and complex compound in which it is shown, 

 while the potentiality of it must, of course, have ex- 

 isted in the elements going to form that compound.* 



* Leibnitz, in his " Monadologie," traces back the germs of con- 

 sciousness to the ultimate atoms of matter, which he holds to be indi- 

 visible and possessing different qualities or properties, which consist 

 essentially in perception; and that the higher living beings are made 

 up of myriads of monads, each with a sort of perception of its own, 

 only of lower intensity than belonged to the central monad predominant 

 in a group and called the soul, or mind, or spirit. If these speculations 

 give us no explanation of the difficulty in. any scientific sense, yet they 

 show us how the greatest minds have striven to bridge over the gulf 

 between mind and matter without the arbitrary supposition of an im- 

 material substance added to matter. The remarks of Fletcher on this 

 point are as follows : " The mode of existence in which perception in. 

 its most circumscribed and simplest form, as displayed by inorganic 

 matter, consists, is exalted in irritation to another mode of existence, 

 in which the character of the perception is altogether changed ; one 

 step farther and the perception becomes such as to be, not, indeed, 

 directly acknowledged by any outward manifestations, but to be 

 for the first time more or less distinctly recognized by the per- 

 cipient itself. The creature exercising it is not yet mentally in- 

 dividualized ; it is not yet rendered distinctly aware of its own 

 existence as a result of this mode of existence ; but it is approaching 

 such a sense of individuality such an apprehension of its own being 

 and attributes. If it be denied that any mode of being like perception 

 can develop consciousness, it may be reasonably asked, how do we 

 know that ? Nay, how do we know, on the other hand, that every 

 mode of being does not develop this condition in a degree more or less 

 proportioned to its more or less exalted character ? We are accustomed 

 to think of consciousness only as connected with thought, and that 

 highest degree of consciousness which constitutes thought in ourselves 

 under ordinary circumstances, absorbs all minor degrees, and is, as it 

 were, identified with our collective existence. ' We think, therefore, 

 we are.' But what right have we to assert that no other degree of 

 consciousness can exist, or be certain that that degree of consciousness 

 which attends sensation, or even that extreme degree of it which con- 

 stitutes thought, cannot result from any mode of being of either the 

 whole or a part of our body, because no such consciousness- results 

 from any other mode of being ? How do we know this ? As indi- 

 vidualized by the exercise of thought, we cannot appreciate any minor- 



