24*0 PHYSIOLOGICAL MATERIALISM. 



This is substantially the view taken by most of the 

 physiological materialists, although from the ways they 

 express themselves, the relation of the phenomenon to 

 force is ambiguous. Thus Mr. Huxley makes the 

 mental dependent on the physical change, calling the 

 former psychosis, and the latter neurosis ; but, as we 

 have seen, he speaks of the mechanical equivalent of 

 consciousness. Fechner, Bain, and Lewes speak of 

 them as two different sides of the same phenomenon 

 as of the convex and concave side of a curve. Mauds- 

 ley, we have seen, speaks of higher kinds of energy 

 involved in central operations in a way, we have en- 

 deavoured to show, is inconsistent with the nature of 

 physical force. He says, also, there is a fallacy in the 

 axiom of Cabanis, because " it is plain that the 

 tangible results of the brain's activity, the waste mat- 

 ters which pass into the blood for assimilation by 

 tissues of a lower kind, and for ultimate excretion 

 from the body, might not less rightly be called the 

 secretion of the brain, and be compared to the bile, 

 than the intangible energy revealed in the mental 

 phenomena" (p. 42). This, taken in connection with 

 the views Maudsley has just expressed respecting the 

 higher kinds of energy above spoken of, leave us in 

 doubt whether he does not look upon mind as in some 

 way correlated with physical force, in which case the 



-degree of consciousness, either in ourselves or other beings ; but some 

 degree of this state, appreciable by the beings or part of the beings, in 

 which it takes place, is perhaps so far from never resulting from any, 

 that it always results from every mode of existence. There is no real 

 violence done, then, by the apparently abrupt introduction, as a result 

 of a certain mode of being, even of that degree of consciousness which 

 constitutes thought, and, still less, of that minor degree which con- 

 stitutes sensation" (iii. p. 11). 



